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INTRODUCTION
Afghanistan, a land locked country with a rugged terrain
about the size of Texas, had been an age old buffer between
the British India and the Central Asian Empire of Russia.
Being always under the traditional rule of Amirs (Kings) it
made an abortive attempt to modernize itself first in the
1920s under King Amanullah and then again in the 1960s under
King Zahir Shah when a faltering attempt was made to
introduce democratic institutions into a backward society.
This period soon ended with the coup of Sardar Mohammad Daoud
against his cousin King Zahir Shah in 1973. Thus, Daoud
assumed power in Afghanistan for the second time for a period
of five years that was terminated by the 1978 coup.
Ironically enough the clique—Abdul Qader, Aslam Watanjar,
Sayed M. Gulabzoy and S.J. Mazdooryar—that brought him into
power following the 1973 coup were also the principal
conspirators in the 1978 coup against Daoud himself. 1
In the early years of his regime, Daoud reciprocated the
support extended to him by the Parcham party 2 in his rise to
power by appointing them to several key positions in the
government. A revolutionary program of social and political
reform and reinvigorated economic development was announced.
The Soviet Union was too eager to support Daoud in his
endeavors by increasing the assistance in military and other
developmental projects. Education and land distribution
reforms were introduced. The government was not only
authoritarian but also seemed inclined to the left. As a
result it was out of expediency that the Parcham party
staunchly supported Daoud's government during the early
years
.
The Khalqis on the other hand maintained their vehement
opposition to Daoud government's conservative policies. It
was during this period that the left through governmental
machinery unleashed a systematic process of persecution of
its opponents; their wrath fell on the Islamic movement.
Many leaders of this movement were exterminated.
Soon Daoud came to the stark realization that he could
not rule as dynamically as he had done during his previous
tenure from 1953 to 1963. The reason being that in 1973 he
was brought back to power by the Parchamis. Thus, in getting
assistance from them in his return to power, Daoud was
expected to follow the social program chalked out by the
Parcham and remain a loyal ally of the Soviet Union. In his
quest to reduce the power already being exercised by the
leftists in the government, Daoud decided to move his regime
to the right. Consequently, his approach toward. his leftist
collaborators shifted and he began purging his former
benefactors.
In 1975, Sardar Daoud founded his own party, The
National Revolutionary Party, thus making Afghanistan a one-
party republic. In order to implement his one-party
framework for the polity of the country, he introduced the
1977 constitution. The constitution was designed to give
Daoud complete political power through a strong presidency
and a weak legislature. The new constitution also called for
the appointment of a new cabinet. The leftists nourished
dreams of adequate representation in the new cabinet. But
their dreams were shattered when Daoud decided to include in
the new cabinet "friends, sons of friends, sycophants and
even collateral members of the deposed royal family."-^
During the precarious balance of 1977, Daoud began to
rely more heavily on a selected coterie of advisors who had
replaced the pro-Soviet Central Committee. In April 1978,
just a few days prior to his assassination Daoud began to
consider widening the advisory group to include people with
varied ideological views and technical expertise. He even
toyed with the idea of reviving the name Central Committee,
but the decision to implement the new changes came too late.
Being too involved in the consolidation of his political
power, Daoud's government ignored other aspects such as the
economic and social issues. Unemployment and inflation were
on the increase. Daoud's obsession to maintain total control
alienated many groups with political influence. As a result
of the repression unleashed by the government the Khalq and
Parcham factions of the Peoples Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) agreed to reconcile their differences in
order to divest Daoud of all power. Some scholars contend
that given the nature of sworn enmity between the Khalq and
Parcham factions, a reconciliation could not have been
possible without the assistance of a strong third party,
namely the Soviet Union. It is also widely held belief that
the Communist Party of India played an important role in the
reunification of the two factions of PDPA. 5
In the realm of foreign relations also, many notable
policy changes were made by the government. In the process
to disengage Afghanistan from increasing dependence on the
Soviet Union, Daoud's government began to woo the neighboring
countries particularly Saudia Arabia, Iran and Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia offered $0.5 billion dollar aid to Afghanistan.
Iran offered to construct a railroad from Kabul to Bandr
Abbas which was to serve as a transit route. Iran had also
agreed to provide markets for the Afghan agricultural
products and to assist Afghanistan in developmental works.
"The new era of amity between Iran and Afghanistan had been
heralded by Daoud's acceptance of an agreement to share the
waters of the lower Helmand River basin, which is divided by
their joint border." 6
Most important of all, Iran had offered to serve as a
mediator on the prolonged Pushtunistan dispute between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was in the best interest of
Iran, that the two countries resolve their differences and
reach an amicable solution to the Pushtunistan dispute;
because the dismemberment of Pakistan by Afghanistan would
signal a threat to the Iranian Baluch population.
Some scholars tend to magnify the role played by the
Shah of Iran in seeking rapprochement between Pakistan and
Afghanistan to such a great extent that they tend to assert
that it was the Shah rather than Brezhnev, who incited the
1978 coup d'etat.
Among such scholars is Selig S. Harrison, a senior
associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
In an article published in The Washington Post he writes that
it was the Shah of Iran rather than Leonid Brezhnev, who
triggered the chain of events which finally led to the coup
against Daoud's regime.
Other scholars, however, do not concur with Selig
Harrison's thesis. For example, former Ambassador Robert
Neumann believes that the Shah wanted to increase
Afghanistan's dependence but was cognizant of the fact that
Afghanistan had to maintain its friendship with the Soviets.
Afghanistan's military equipment was Soviet, much
economic aid came from Russia, all of Afghanistan's
natural gas was piped to the USSR and Russia
continued to be Afghanistan's chief trading
partner.
Daoud's persistence in following a non-aligned posture
was a source of great irritation to the Soviets which induced
them to reunify the PDPA in a coup against Daoud. There is
ample evidence to support this thesis. "In 1982, a Soviet
scholar bluntly noted that the Shah's 1975 offer of aid had
the purpose of weakening Soviet-Afghan relations." 9 In
January 1977, when Daoud visited Moscow, the Soviets made no
attempts to mask their displeasure with Afghanistan's
policies:
In a brief, hostile exchange Brezhnev suddenly
challenged Daoud to "get rid of all those
imperialist advisors in your country." Daoud
replied coldly that when Afghanistan had no further
need of foreign advisors, they would all be asked
to leave. Nairn ascribed more significance to this
exchange than did Daoud, who took it as nothing
more than a typical gambit designed to put him on
the defensive.
On the other hand there is some evidence which does not
conform with this thesis. If the Soviets were unhappy with
Daoud, they could have launched a heavy criticism of his
policies. But what they did was guite to the contrary. At
the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976 there was a favorable
reference to Afghanistan. A highly favorable article was
also published in 1977 issue of International Affairs
(Moscow) highly commending Daoud's actions. 1 -1-
The final showdown for Daoud came in 1978, when during a
series of political assassinations taking place in Kabul, a
well-known Parcham ideologue Mir Akber Khyber was killed.
This event triggered large scale demonstrations marking a
swift decline in Daoud's power. Even though several leftist
leaders were arrested, no concerted action was taken against
leftist military officers and Hafizullah Amin who at that
time was the main organizer of the military cadres. This
error cost Daoud his life and the people of Afghanistan their
independence and territorial integrity.
Daoud was replaced by Mohammad Taraki in 1978 who
belonged to the Khalq faction of PDPA. Taraki's tenure was a
short-lived one and he was soon killed in a bloody coup
d'etat staged by Hafizullah Amin on September 16, 1979. It
seems that Moscow did not appear happy with the domestic
policies of Khalq government which were provoking alienation
and strengthening indirectly the resistance movement. This
finally culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan between 24-
27 December, 1979 and the installation of Babrak Karmal as
the new head of the government, whose policies Moscow
preferred.
With this action Moscow succeeded in its long awaited
objective of seeking a physical presence in Afghanistan and
thereby turning it into a crisis of great magnitude.
The Afghanistan crisis now has taken the shape of a
global conflict between the two superpowers. Therefore, the
ramification of this particular crisis are much beyond
Pakistan and Afghanistan and might further deteriorate to
envelope the entire world. It is because of this reason that
it is important to discuss this crisis from the perspective
of several parties involved viz., The Soviet Union, The








A. The Soviet Union interests; B. Conservative Afghans;
C. The U.S. interests; D. Pakistan interests
In order to understand the interests of the various
parties involved in the dispute and to see how a solution
could be reached, it might be useful to construct a model
such as the one shown in Figure 1. The model has four shaded
areas, each representing the non-negotiable interests of the
four parties—the Afghan mujahideen, Soviet Russia, the U.S.
and Pakistan. The clear area . represents the overlapping
interests of these parties. It is in the interest of each
party to extend the shaded area by occupying the clear
ground. A viable solution can emerge only after an agreement
has been reached between the four interlocutors as to how the
clear area is to be shared and occupied. While the chapters
that follow will provide detailed analysis of how the shaded
areas of Figure 1 have come to be occupied and the concluding
chapter will suggest how an eguilibrium could be reached, it
might be useful to provide an example here of the way this
model works.
Chapter One provides a historical overview of
Afghanistan-Russian relationship which resulted in the
definitions of Soviet interests in Afghanistan. However, by
sending its troops into Afghanistan, the Soviets sought to
push their share in Afghanistan by occupying the clear area
as indicated by the dotted line. The dotted line clearly
affected the conservative elements in Afghanistan since a
part of their non-negotiable area had been over run by the
Soviets. For instance, the Soviet invasion meant de-
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Islamization of Afghanistan, a situation that the
conservatives could not accept. The conservatives responded
by organizing themselves against the Soviets in an attempt to
get area I vacated. The Pakistani area of non-negotiable
interests—unwillingness to have Soviets at its borders—was
also directly threatened by the Soviet invasion. By
receiving the refugees and providing them with military
assistance, Pakistan began the process of pushing the Soviets
out of area II. While the U.S. was not directly threatened
—
the dotted line does not reach into area C, by occupying a
portion of the clear area, the Soviets clearly posed a threat
to the U.S. The U.S. responded by helping both Pakistan (the
large aid program) and the mujahideen (supply of weapons).
The concluding chapter will indicate as to how equilibrium
could be reached by the agreed and negotiated occupation of
the clear area rather than by the unilateral advance of the
type indicated by the dotted line.
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1. SOVIET MOTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN
In this chapter I intend to explore the following theme:
reorientation of Russian policy towards the republics of
Central Asia from de-islamization to Sovietization and
finally to the promotion of global stategic interests. The
experience of Soviet domination in Central Asia will be used
to illustrate the Soviet perception of their interests and
actions in Afghanistan. Here a look at the past history of
Russian relations with the Central Asian Republics under both
Tsarist and Soviet regimes is of great importance in
amplifying my thesis.
DE-ISLAMIZATION; -
The Russian encroachment of Muslim Central Asia can be
divided into three stages. First is the Tsardom of Moscow
from 1552 - 1605. This is followed by the second period of
Russian expansionism toward the West; (during which their
expansionism in the East was treated as a secondary
objective) it began with the days of Ivan the Terrible and
was finished before Catherine II ascended the throne. The
last period starts with the Russian directed expansionism
towards Asia under Romanovs, that is from Catherine II to
1900. 1
These three periods are marked by the Russian conquests
of Muslim lands with concomitant result of Muslim economic
decadence and forced conversion of Muslims to Christianity.
The presence of an overwhelming majority of Muslims in the
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areas of Dar-ul-Islam (Abode of Islam) (Middle Volga, Lower
Volga and Western Siberia) augmented the problem of national
identity perceived by the Russians as a constant source of
threat to their "Russian empire". The Russians tried to
solve the nationality problem in regions where Muslims
enjoyed a considerable majority such as in Crimea, Volga,
Caucasus, and Kazakh steppes, Kazakhistan, Azerbaijan,
Turkestan. Several different approaches were applied in each
of these regions which included cultural Russif ication,
preservation of law and order in certain areas such as in the
Caucasus and ruthless religious and social persecution in
others. For instance:
. . . between 1738 and 1755, 418 out of 536 mosques
of the Kazan gubernia disappeared; Waqf property
was confiscated by the state. . . . intense
missionary activity was instituted while Muslim
counter measures were punishable by death; Muslims
were expelled from villages where groups of
converts had been formed and deported to remote
districts
.
In short, the Russians resorted to the use of brute
force in an effort to de-islamicize the Muslim society and
subsequently solving the nationality problem. In some areas
they succeeded such as in the Volga region, Azerbaijan
(through indirect rule) while in others the problem simply
aggravated even further. The Russians were convinced that in
order to keep the Russian Empire intact, the Muslim
population had to be subjugated. The end of the Tsarist
Russia did not bring an end to the 'nationality problem'; it




According to the Soviets, the solution of the
nationality problem lay in the scientific Marxist - Leninist
doctrine. Later, when this strategy proved to be a failure,
the Soviets decided to follow the pattern of their
predecessors in their treatment of the Muslims. This pattern
based on a systematic elimination of the Muslims carried out
by genocide and expulsion or the integration of the Muslims
into the Soviet society through Sovietization. Several large
scale expulsions were carried out in Crimea and Meshketian
region of Southern Georgia (1944); and in North Central
Caucasus (mid-40s).
In the mid-20s the proposed creation of a Muslim state
called the Republic of Turan, in the southern region of the
Soviet Union, could not win the approval of the Soviets, who
believed that as long as the Muslims remained as one nation
they posed a threat to the claims of Soviet leadership.
Therefore, the destruction of Muslim unity was the only way
to solve the 'nationality problem 1 . This was done by
fragmenting the Muslim nation into several small modern
nations. Each nation was to have its own territorial
demarcation, official language, state apparatus, economic
interests, historical and cultural traditions.
This plan was most successfully carried out in the
Volga-Ural district. In the North Caucasus area the Soviets
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got carried away with the enforcement of their program which
eventually led to the creation of micro-nationalities of
tribal type. In the Central Asian region the Soviet strategy
was opposed vehemently, where they created several nations
and nationalities each with its own area and language.
It was during the first decade of the Soviet regime that
there took place a portentous development, the emergence of
Muslim National Communists, led by Sultan Galiev, a Volga
Tatar. This movement was an abortive attempt to synthesize
Islamic religion, nationalism, and Marxism. The adherents of
the movement tried to adapt Marxism to their own convictions
and using it as a tool to achieve national liberation, a
Muslim way to communism and Eastern strategy, representing
very seldom the proletariat, capitalism or the class
struggle. Thus, as these ideas stood in conflict with
Stalin's monolithic order, therefore the movement was
liquidated in 1923.
The Muslims in the Soviet Union remained in a state of
constant conflict for seven centuries with Muscovy, later
Russia and still later the Soviet Union. Interestingly
however, for the Muslims of the Soviet Union there is little
difference between their old and new masters. The former
rulers were Christians and the present ones are athiests both
essentially belonging to the same stock—the Russians and
exercising the great Russian imperialism. This imperialistic
policy is most evident in a nineteenth century Russian
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manifesto used in justifying the expedition against the Khan
of Khiva (1839). The manifesto reads as follows:
The Rights of Russia, the security of her trade,
the tranguility of her subjects, and the dignity of
the state call for decisive measures ... to make
the inhabitants . . . esteem and respect the
Russian name, and finally to strengthen in that
part of Asia the lawful influence to which Russia
has a right, and which alone can insure the
maintenance of peace.
Till the later part of the 1960s, the Muslims in the
Soviet Union lived in isolation from the rest of the world.
It was after the Khruschev era that the Soviet Muslims were
used as a tool to cultivate links with the rest of the Muslim
world. This new Soviet policy was in pursuit of three
objectives:
To demonstrate to the outside world and the Third
world in particular, by using Central Asia and
Caucasus as a showcase of Communist economic
achievements, that the Soviet experiment is more
powerful and rewarding than Western capitalism. To
testify to the freedom welfare, and general
prosperity of Islam in the Soviet Union; and thus
to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is the best
friend and partner of the Islamic world.
The cooperation between Soviet Islamic establishment and
the Muslim world was carried out by visits and conferences in
the Soviet Union; visits abroad by the Soviet muftis and
propaganda broadcasts by Soviet muslim authorities. This
phase was a short lived one and soon came to an end when the
Muslim countries criticized the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
PROMOTION OF GLOBAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS: -
"The road to Paris and London lies through the
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towns of Afghanistan, Punjab and Bengal."
- Leon Trotsky.
Afghanistan, a landlocked country with a rugged terrain
about the size of Texas, was invaded by the Soviet Union in
December 1979.
The history of Afghanistan is the history of a small
country that has to learn to live in the shadows of great
powers. What has complicated Afghanistan's situation is the
constant state of flux in its geopolitical environment. A
number of remarkable changes occurred in its neighborhood
within a short period as the interests of those who wielded
power in Moscow changed from the Russian subjugation of the
Central Asian Republics (through the use of schemes that
aimed to de-Islamize Central Asia) to the protection of their
larger strategic interests. At the same time the departure
of Britain from the South Asian subcontinent in 1947
introduced the United States into the Great Game. Balancing
these changing interests called for the display of remarkable
dexterity on the part of Afghan rulers. Those who succeeded
in reconciling these divergent and changing interests managed
to stay in power for sometime; those who failed usually paid
dearly for their lack of success, usually with their lives as
happened to King Habibullah in 1918, King Nadir Shah in 1933,
President Daoud in 1978, and Hafizullah Amin in 1979.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and
the tight control exercised subsequently by Moscow over Kabul
point to two conclusions important in any analysis of the
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Afghan situation. First, it is difficult to impose by force
or dictate a foreign ideology in a society as weak in
political development and as deeply embedded in tradition as
Afghanistan in the 1970s. The fracturing of the Marxist
movement in Afghanistan is a manifestation of this problem.
This fracturing resulted in a number of swift changes in
Afghan leadership. The second important conclusion concerns
Soviet motives: The Russian move into Afghanistan was not
dictated by the Leninist-Marxist approach towards the spread
of socialism but the Brezhnev doctrine of protecting the
outer flanks of the Soviet empire. Examination of the
Soviet-Afghan relationship will help us to determine the
Soviet strategic interests and also identify the motives that
lay behind the invasion of Afghanistan. It was in the
nineteenth century that Afghanistan became the playing ground
of the Great Game between the British Crown and Tsarist
Russia. The term Great Game was coined by the British to
refer to the activities of Russian and British intelligentsia
in the area of northwestern border land of the British
India. It was in 1837 that the Russians for the first time
evinced an interest in Afghanistan by the siege of Herat.
This gave rise to the tensions beween the British and Russian
Empires. But the far sighted British were guick to realize
that to have a pro-British Afghanistan would be advantageous
to them because such a situation would forestall the Russian
threat of using Afghanistan as a springboard for further
18
expansionism in the direction of the Indian subcontinent.
When the British felt that they could not get the
acquiescence of Dost Mohammad in order to carry out their
long-range policy, the British decided to wage war against
Afghanistan. The first war was fought from 1839 to 1842.
During the first phase of this war they succeeded in bringing
their puppet Shah Shura to the throne. This war was a rather
trying experience for the British and resulted in its
eventual retreat. By the autumn of 1842 Dost Mohammad was
again restored to power with the help of a local rebellion.
Though the British suffered heavy military defeat they
succeeded in having a pro-British Afghanistan; because by
then Dost Mohammad had become far more amenable toward the
British.
While the British were embroiled in Afghanistan, the
Russians were busy in the conquest of Central Asian
republics. The tensions between the two empires were renewed
when Russia invaded Khiva in 1873. The rationale behind the
invasion of Khiva given by the Russians was:
The rights of Russia, the security of her trade,
the tranquility of her subjects and the dignity of
the state, call for decisive measures; and the
Emperor has judged it to be time to send a body of
troops to Khiva, to put an end to robbery and
exaction, to deliver those Russians who are
detained in slavery to make the inhabitants of
Khiva esteem and respect the Russian name, and
finally to strengthen in that part of Asia the
lawful influence to which Russia has a right, and
which alone can insure the maintenance of peace.
This is the purpose of the present expedition, and
soon as it shall be attained and an order of things
comfortable to the interests of Russia and the
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neighboring Asiatic state shall be established on a
permanent footing, the body of troops which has
received orders to march on Khiva will return to
the frontiers of the empire.
Such a policy seriously threatened the paranoid Sher
Ali, successor of Dost Mohammad, who urged the British to
guarantee him assistance in case of Russian encroachments
toward Afghanistan. By 1878, Russia sent a diplomatic
mission to Kabul which subsequently led to the establishment
of diplomatic ties with Afghanistan. In order to
counterbalance the presence of Russian mission, the British
dispatched their own mission to Kabul. But due to the lack
of a positive response from Sher Ali, the British invaded
Afghanistan. This action prompted Kabul to enter into a
defense alliance with the Russians which proved quite useless
since the Russian commander in Central Asia felt that it was
quite "impossible in winter to send troops across
Afghanistan's mountain backbone, the Hindu Kush to Kabul." 7
In 1880 Abdur Rahman Khan commonly known as the "Iron
Amir", ascended the throne after spending twelve years in
exile in Russia. The British moved quickly and extended
recognition to him. He was particularly unreceptive to the
Russian overtures and admonished his son, "My last words to
you my son and successor, are: Never trust the Russians." 8
The Amir wanted to deter the foreign influence in the country
particularly Russian and concentrate his energies on
strengthening the internal self-determination. He believed
that this objective could be achieved by keeping the country
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backward, poor, unaccessible and unattractive to those with
imperial designs. During his reign the Afghan and Russian
soldiers in 1885 fought to establish control over an oasis
100 miles south of Merv. A few years later, the British
forced upon the reluctant Amir the 'Durand Line' which
divided the Pushtun population and was later to be a sore
point in Pak-Afghan relations.
In 1901, Abdur Rahman was succeeded by his son Amir
Habibullah, who followed a more liberal course than his
father's hardline, conservative approach. And his son Amir
Amanullah popularly known as the 'Socialist King' was even
more liberal than his father; and because of his liberal
approach he was forced to abdicate his throne. Amir
Amanullah, who was far more complaisant than his predecessor,
had ascended the throne at the time of his father's
assassination in 1918.
By this time the Great Game also came to an end with the
signing of St. Petersburg convention in 1917. This
convention resulted in the eventual division of Persia into
two spheres of influence, with Tibet serving as a neutral
state. Afghanistan was proclaimed as a buffer state by the
two empires. This buffer state under the reign of Amir
Amanullah declared war on the British India in 1919. The
Third Anglo-Afghan war that ensued, resulted in the military
defeat of Amanullah but he emerged victorious from the peace
conference. He succeeded in getting independence, by ending
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the British tutelage of 40 years over Afghanistan. The World
War I weary Britain was too pleased to concede to his demand
and the Afghans were granted independence in the internal and
external matters on August 8, 1919.
Upon getting independence from Britain, Afghanistan's
Amir, King Amanullah, received a letter from Lenin extending
recognition to Amanullah's accession to the throne. The
contents of the letter contained revolutionary rhetoric:
His Majesty the Emir of Afghanistan at present,
flourishing Afghanistan is the only independent
Moslem state in the world and fate sends the Afghan
people the great historic task of writing about
itself, the enslaved Mohammadan peoples and leading
them on the road to freedom and independence. ^
Later, Lenin in a response to Amanullah's proposal for
diplomatic relations wrote:
The Workers and Peasants Government instructs its
embassy in Afghanistan to engage in discussions
with a view to the conclusion of trade and other
friendly agreements . . . (and to pursue) together
with Afghanistan joint struggle against the
rapacious imperialistic government on earth—Great
Britain.
. . . The Afghan people wish to receive
military aid against England from the Russian
people. The Workers and Peasants Government is
inclined to grant such assistance on the widest
scale to the Afghan nation, and to repair the
injustice done by the former government of the
Russian Czars. ... by adjusting the Soviet-
Afghan frontier so as to add to the territory of
Afghanistan at the expense of Russia. *
The promise to provide military aid to Afghanistan in
case of a British onslaught never materialized because by the
time this letter was written, the Third Anglo-Afghan war had
ended. And since, the Moslem border region of the USSR was
engaged in a revolt, the writ of the government did not even
22
reach the river Amu Darya.
**
Moreover, the prospects for amicable relations with
Afghanistan were clouded due to the treatment of the Muslim
republics at the hands of the Soviets. Bolsheviks who prior
to the revolution had pledged to grant "the right of all the
nations forming part of Russia freely to secede and form
independent states" 14 did not honor the pledge, especially
when it came to the revolt of the Uzbek and Tajik population.
Even though Amanullah was displeased with the Soviets
because of their policies in Central Asia, but still he
preferred them to the British as allies. As a result, the
Treaty of Friendship was signed between Afghanistan and the
Soviet Union in 1921. The Soviet Union pledged to abide by
the terms of the treaty, which were:
To respect the independence of Bokhara and Khiva (a
promise never kept) to return two districts Terek
and Kerki, that had been seized by Russia in the
nineteenth century, and to give Amanullah a subsidy
of 1 million rubles a year (a promise that was only
partly kept).
The Soviets had also agreed to provide Afghanistan with
some aircraft, five thousand rifles with ammunition and to
assist Afghanistan in installing an aviation school and a
gunpowder plant. 16 Another important clause of the treaty
was, "to refrain from entering into a military or political
agreement with a third power to the detriment of the other
signatory nation." 17 This treaty was the first example of an
international agreement that the Soviets entered into
following their Bolshevik revolution.
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Soviet-Afghan relations were seriously affected during
1921 to 1924 by the Basmachi revolt led by the Muslim rebels
in Central Asia. The word Basmach is derived from the Turkic
word Basmak meaning to fall on, attack. 18 But to the Soviets
it meant bandits or robbers. 19 The Basmachi problem was
compounded by the Soviet promise to Afghanistan under the
Treaty of 1921 to honor the "independence and freedom of
Khiva and Bukhara in whatever form that agreed with the
wishes of the people." 2
By the mid 1920s, the Soviets were able to quell the
Basmachi revolt through a series of military, political and
economic measures, and thereby self-determination was denied.
This movement had the support of Amanullah who had conjured
up dreams of a single Central Asian confederation with Kabul
as its capital.
From 1924 to 1929 Amanullah tried to contain the British
and Soviet influence in Afghanistan. But with the outbreak
of a revolt in Khost against Amanullah in 1924, Afghan-Soviet
friendship was intensified as a result of Soviet assistance
in putting down the revolt. The Soviets also helped him by
erecting telegraph and telephone lines, built a radio
station,' established an airline connecting Kabul with
Tashkent and Moscow, and gave him a dozen airplanes, along
with the pilots and mechanics to service them. 21
During King Amanullah's tenure the Soviet Union made two
successive attempts to invade Afghanistan, one in 1925 and
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the other in 1929. The first invasion of Afghanistan took
place some fifty years ago in 1925 when the Soviet forces
occupied a disputed Afghan island in the Amu Darya, in order
to prevent some of the basmachis from using it as a base
against the Soviet Union. After invading the island the
Soviet authorities announced its annexation to the USSR.
This announcement caused a wave of anger among the Afghan
populace and the two countries momentarily harbored war
designs against each other. The tension cooled off only
after the Soviets decided to pull out their forces and
recognize Afghan control of the island.
In 1928, Amanullah Khan undertook a trip to Europe where
he met Kamal Ataturk of Turkey and having been inspired by
the modernization of Turkey, he decided to introduce the same
pattern of reforms in his quest to modernize Afghanistan.
The reforms introduced by him included the unveiling of
women, opening coeducational schools, forcing all Afghans to
wear western attire, and the introduction of a secular code
of laws along with the Sharia. These radical reforms angered
the conservative elements in Afghanistan who believed that he
"had turned against Allah and Islam!" 22 and they revolted
against him. The revolt of 1928 was led by an illiterate
Tajik bandit called Bacha-i-Saqao (son of water carrier) and
it culminated in the dethronement of King Amanullah. A
period of anarchy followed during which Bacha-i-Saqao ruled
for nine months, when he too was deposed by Nadir Shah.
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Amanullah however, was able to maintain a rapport with
the Soviet Union despite the fact that there had been periods
of tension between the two countries. And when he was forced
to abdicate the throne the Soviets tried to restore him to
power. According to David C. Montgomery the Soviets had two
reasons for helping Amanullah to regain the lost throne: the
first was to bring the Afghan ruler under obligation to the
Soviet Union and thereby enhance the Soviet influence in
Afghanistan; the second was to crush the Central Asian
Muslims' rebellious tendencies that were brewing up in the
Uzbek-speaking areas of the Soviet Union, adjacent to
Afghanistan, and who were using Afghanistan as a refuge. 2 -*
Moscow's decision to assist Amanullah had also been
shaped by the influence of the four Charkhi brothers who had
held important posts in the government of the deposed King:
Ghulam Nabi, minister to Moscow; Ghulam Siddiq, foreign
minister; Ghulam Jilani who was previously the governor of
Mazar-i-Sharif
, and then minister to Turkey; and Abdul Aziz,
who succeeded Ghulam Jilani as governor of Mazar. 24 Ghulam
Nabi, the minister in Moscow, persuaded the Soviet government
to support Amanullah. His pleas were reinforced by his
brother Ghulam Nabi (who had been sent to Moscow by
Amanullah) and Ghulam Jilani from Turkey. 25
In order to comply with Ghulam Nabi's request the
Soviets in April 1929 raised an army of 800-1000 Kirghiz
soldiers led by Ghulam Nabi. 26 They succeeded in crossing
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the Amu Darya river and capturing the northern cities of
Mazar-i-Sharif and Tashkurgan after defeating the ill-
eguipped Afghan army. To aid Ghulam Nabi there was a former
Soviet military attache in Kabul by the name of Col. K.M.
Primakoff. This contingent had barely reached Kabul, when
they received orders from Moscow to abandon the mission and
return to the Soviet Union. The withdrawal brought an end to
the second attempt of invasion by the Soviet Union. It is
believed that the worldwide criticism of Soviet action had
prompted the withdrawal, because the Soviet Union was still
trying to establish an image for itself in the world
community which it did not wish to mar.^ 7
On October 15, 1929 Nadir Shah came to power after
defeating Bacha-i-Sagao. He returned the country to
customary Islamic law and developed a new constitution which
lasted until the 1960s. He reversed all of the laws
introduced by Amanullah and remained in power until 1933.
In 1930, the Soviets looking forward to another
expedition in Afghanistan, penetrated 40 miles into that
2 8
country.'' This invasion was launched under the pretext of
dealing with Ibrahim Beg, the rebel leader, who was later
caught by the Soviet forces. Nadir Shah who looked upon the
policies of Amanullah with great aversion was shot in 1933,
and his son Mohammad Zahir came to the throne.
During 1920 and 1930s, the Soviets were busy crushing
domestic opposition at home and therefore Afghanistan did not
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loom large in Soviet Union's deliberations. As J. Bruce
Amstutz notes:
. . . the Soviet Union saw as its main foreign
policy objective the need to obtain diplomatic
recognition and international pledges of non-
interference. A second priority was ideological
—
to spread international communism through the
mechanism of the Comintern. Afghanistan figured
only tangentially in both policies. 29
It is quite difficult to accept this reasoning at face
value. Because, by analyzing the Soviet Union's aggression
against Afghanistan in 1925, 1929 and 1930 it becomes quite
evident that the Soviet Union was following into the policies
of their predecessors: the will to use military force in
Afghanistan for the implementation of their long range
objectives. During the course of the Second World War, the
technicians, both civil and military who had been sent to
Afghanistan under Amanullah's reign, had returned to the
Soviet Union. The Soviet offer to establish trade mission in
1936 had also been rejected by the Afghans. The situation
however changed with the departure of the British from this
region in 1947 and the coming into power of Daoud Khan in
1953.
THE SOVIET INFLUENCE INCREASES: -
"Given the demise of British India, Russian
occupation of Afghanistan was inevitable and it is
surprising that it took the Russians 32 years to
achieve it."
Sir Olaf Caroe, scholar and
Governor of Northwest Frontier
Province (1946-47), July 1981.
The exodus of the British from South Asia in 1947
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created a vacuum which provided an opportunity for the rapid
increase of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The Soviet
Union, George F. Kennan argued, would press its advantage
wherever the West appeared vulnerable and would seek to fill
any power vacuum which appeared. According to him the Soviet
Union a protagonist of a revolutionary and anti-status quo
ideology would miss no opportunity to extend its physical and
ideological boundaries. 30
The government in Moscow headed by Joseph Stalin was
embroiled in the Cold war and Korean dispute and therefore it
paid little attention to Afghanistan. It was only when
Nikita Khruschev came to power that the political scenario
changed. Britain's withdrawal from this region was filled in
by the United States, in whose policies Afghanistan did not
figure prominently (this aspect will be discussed in detail
in the following chapter of the U.S.).
The period from 1955 to 1978 in Soviet-Afghan relations
played a very important role in determining the communist
revolution of 1978. The quest for two important objectives
of Afghanistan's royal family increased its dependency on the
Soviet Union. The first objective was a desire to modernize
the country. The other goal was winning independence of the
Pushtun people living across the Durand Line in a newly
created country called Pakistan. 31 The Soviets exploited
these two objectives to the fullest and signed an agreement
on July 17, 1950. This agreement was to be followed by a
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long chain of subsequent agreements, leading to the stage of
total Afghan dependency on the Soviet Union during the Daoud
era. The 1950 agreement provided for duty-free transit of
Afghan goods over Soviet territory. 32 It also "provided for
an exchange of Afghan agricultural products in return for
Soviet petroleum products, cotton cloth, sugar and other
commodities. This agreement also gave the Soviets an
opportunity to exercise some leverage on Afghanistan in
political spheres. For example the UN sponsored oil
exploration in 1952 was objected to by the Soviets because of
concern for the security of its industrial complexes in
Central Asia. Thus, the Afghans went to the United States
for help but did not get any positive response. 33
In the early 1950s Afghanistan also requested arms aid
and support for the Pushtunistan issue from the U.S. But
since the U.S. was at that time courting Pakistan therefore
it could not assist Afghanistan either by providing arms or
by supporting its stand on the Pushtunistan issue. Taking
advantage of the United States indifferent attitude, the
Soviet Union in January 1954, made a loan of $3.5 million to
Afghanistan, which was payable in eight years with an
interest rate of 3 percent. 34 This loan was the first in its
kind to be given to a country outside the Soviet bloc and
that too after the death of Joseph Stalin ten months
earlier. 35 In December 1955, the Communist Party's First
Secretary Khruschev and Prime Minister Bulganin visited
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Afghanistan and announced a loan of $100 million. They also
extended for ten years the 1931 treaty of friendship and
nonaggression. 36 The projects which were carried out by the
loan of $100 million were: "(1) two airports, one military,
one civilian; (2) two hydroelectric plants; (3) a road
maintenance plant; (4) a road over the Hindu Kush with a
tunnel which would connect northern and southern Afghanistan
for the first time; (5) and three irrigation projects." 37 By
1979, the Soviets had funneled in so much economic assistance
in Afghanistan that they boastfully claimed at the advent of
the invasion:
Over the years the USSR has helped Afghanistan in
some 120 industrial, agricultural and other
projects of which about 70 have already been
completed.
. . . The USSR has aided Afghanistan in
building 70 percent of its hard-surface roads . . .
and three of its four international airports. 38
The Soviets in March 1956 signed an agreement, which
gave the Soviets an opportunity to send their specialists to
Afghanistan with the purpose of guiding the Afghans in the
maintenance, installation and repair of various equipment
being utilized in connection with the aid projects. 39 A few
months later in July 1956, the Soviets had agreed to provide
a loan of $32 million for the purchase of Soviet weapons. 40
According to the August 1956, Soviet-Afghan agreement for
military hardware worth $25 million dollars was made
available to Afghanistan. Later that year in October, eleven
MIG-15 fighters were received by the Afghans. From 1953-63,
the Soviets were also constructing the military airfields in
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Bagram, near Kabul; Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan
and at Shindad in the central part of western Afghanistan. 41
The Soviets also increased their influence in the tactical
expertise, especially when the Turkish military officers were
replaced by Soviet instructors in 1963. At the same time
about 4,000 Afghan military officers were sent to the Soviet
Union for training. 2 In the years that followed thousands
of Afghan army and airforce officers received their training
in the Soviet Union which was bound to prove fateful for
Afghanistan in the subsequent years. As Thomas T. Hammond
writes:
The decision to send officers to the Soviet Union
for training may have been one of the most fateful
choices ever made by the Afghan government. As a
result, a majority of the officer corps spent some
time in the USSR, where the Soviets could attempt
to indoctrinate them with proSoviet and
procommunist views or recruit them as Soviet
agents. 43
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union came closer to each
other by way of military and trade assistance during the
period from 1956 to 1963. Using the total value of Afghan
trade as an index from 1951-58, Afghan interaction with the
socialist bloc increased from 14.7 percent in 1951 to 33.9
percent in 1958; and the dollar value of Soviet-Afghan trade
also increased from $32 million (1956) to $46 million
(1962). 44
Even though the Soviets had provided $400 million in
development assistance from 1953 to 1963, and it had also
exceeded $20 million dollars worth of military aid to
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Afghanistan; but still Afghanistan did not become a client
state of the Soviet Union, nor did Daoud become a Soviet
protege. 45 Nevertheless, Daoud's departure from the office
did not seriously affect the Soviet-Afghan relations. Both
military and economic assistance were continued at the same
pace during King Zahir Shah's regime from 1963 to 1973.
During King Zahir Shah's tenure two important developments
took place: The promulgation of the Constitution of 1964
after the ratification from a Loya Jirgah46 and the formation
of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The
1964 constitution brought about many changes in the political
arena. Though it promised the establishment of a popular
government encompassing: "The National Assembly, the Senate,
the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Committee,
the Constitutional Advisory Commission, additional members to
be elected from the provinces egual in number to the National
Assembly and finally, members appointed at the King's
discretion to insure adequate presentation of all points of
view." It left the government unsuccessful in solving the
problems emanating from economic and social aspects of Afghan
society.
THE GENESIS OF MARXISM: -
The other development was the creation of Peoples
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The creation of PDPA
did not mark the beginning of Marxism in Afghanistan. The
advent of Marxist movement in Afghanistan took place in 1915
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with the arrival of a joint Turko-German mission. The
mission comprised of some renowned personalities of the
Indian National Revolutionaries, the most notable ones being:
Maulana Barkatullah, Obaidullah Sindhi and Raja Mehendra
Pratap. This mission "introduced the secular concepts of
Marxism to Afghan intellectuals for the first time." 48
The Marxist ideals became quite popular among students
who generally hailed from "families of social and political
49prominence." The first youth organization comprising pro-
Soviet elements was founded in 1947 called the Wikh-i-
Zalmayan (Awakened Youth). 50 These students were given
recognition by the government during 1949-52 and were elected
to the nominal national parliament. They however, soon were
regarded as a dangerous elite, in 1953 by the government
because of their radical views. Thus, "this first generation
of student reformers generally provided the foundation for
the liberal changes that were attempted in 1963.
"
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During the constitutional period 1964-73, the Afghan
society could be stratified into four ideological groups.
First, conservatives or traditionalists who were interested
in retaining Afghan culture under Islamic norms. Second,
adapters who were seeking to merge western technology and
managerial tasks with Afghan culture, and Islamic teachings.
Third, those who wanted to follow western models of
democratic republics were known as democratic. . And last of
all, were the Marxist-Leninist who were primarily interested
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in establishing a communist government. 52 Marxists accused
the monarchy for being the cause of economic and social
deprivation of the Afghan society and were able to propagate
their views among the student community upon whom they
exercised a profound influence.
The Afghan communist movement began in January 1965 with
the establishment of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan in Kabul. The movement was pioneered by Nur
Mohammad Taraki along with his 30 comrades. The objective of
the movement was "building a socialist society in Afghanistan
based on
. . . adapting Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
principles to conditions in Afghanistan." 53 The two other
prominent figures of PDPA besides Nur Mohammad Taraki were:
Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin.
Nur Mohammad Taraki, the Secretary General of PDPA was a
Pushtun born in 1917, had worked in Bombay (India) as a
teenager where he got acquainted with Marxist ideals from
Indian Communists. Later, in 1930s he worked for the
government of Afghanistan in different capacities. He served
as a press attache in Washington, D.C. in 1952. During his
stay in Washington he sought political asylum after
ridiculing President Daoud in a press conference. On being
denied political asylum, he returned to Kabul where, as his
official biography reveals, he telephoned Daoud to say, "I am
Nur Mohammad Taraki. I have just arrived. Shall I go home
or to prison?" 54 Taraki later served as the leader of the
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Khalq faction and President of Afghanistan from April 28,
1978 to September 14, 1979.
The other prominent figure was Hafizullah Amin born in
late 1920s. He belonged to Ghilzai pushtun family near
Paghman in Kabul province. 55 He earned a Master's degree
from Columbia University in late 1950s. He went to Columbia
again in 1963 on a scholarship to work for a Ph.D which he
never finished. It is believed that his Marxist views were
reinforced during his summer school in the University of
Wisconsin. 56 He was also the President of Associated
Students of Afghanistan (ASA) in the U.S.
He served as President of Afghanistan for a few months
and was assassinated on December 28, 1979. After 1979 Amin
was accused of being a CIA agent recruited during his student
years in the U.S. seeking to destroy true Marxist leadership
in the PDPA. 57
The third prominent figure was Babrak Karmal, born in
1919 at Kanary near Kabul into a Pushtun family. It is
believed that his name Karmal was an acronym based on Karl
5 8Marx Lenin. ° He received modern education and became an
active participant of liberal student reform movement in
early 1950s. He was a leader of the Parcham faction and a
long time KGB agent. 59 Later, in December 1979 he became the
President of Afghanistan.
It was in 1967, that PDPA split into several factions
over organizational problems. The two most important
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factions were: Khalq (masses) and Parcham (banner). The
former was led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and the latter by
Babrak Karmal. Earlier in 1966 the Khalq had also started
publishing a newspaper called the Khalq. Because of its
revolutionary rhetoric the government had to ban it and since
then the "Khalq faction became more clandestine." 60 The
Khalq faction comprised mainly of Pushtuns who favored "a
Leninist-type party based on the working class," while Babrak
Karmal's Parcham favored "a broad national-democratic
front." 61 Parcham was far more active than the Khalq
faction. Parcham continued its publication until 1969 and
was often accused by Khalq of being pro-government. Thus,
the personality differences, social origins and tactics
widened the gulf further, and the Parcham faction succeeded
in bringing Daoud to power on July 17, 1973. It was in 1977
that the two factions united under Soviet influence to oust
Daoud from power. They succeeded in their motive and Daoud
was killed in a bloody coup d'etat staged by Mohammad Taraki
on April 28, 1978.
ROUTE TO THE 1979 INVASION: -
Mohammad Taraki became the new President and Head of the
Revolutionary Council. Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal
served as his deputy Prime Ministers. The cabinet was
composed of eleven ministers from Khalq and ten from the
Parcham faction. The new regime avoided the communist label
and proclaimed Afghanistan as the Democratic Republic of
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Afghanistan. By 1975, the Soviets had also succeeded in
making some inroads as far as the economic dependence of
Afghanistan was concerned. The economic aid to Afghanistan
by the Soviet Union in 1975 was allocated to help in the
completion of 20 major projects in agriculture, irrigation,
electric power, mineral and metal processing and
transportation. The total economic credits to Afghanistan by
the Soviet Union were in the amount of $437 million in
1975. 62 TnuS/ With the Marxist coup in 1978, the Soviet
economic influence was greatly enhanced. 63 Nearly 3,000
Soviet military and economic advisers were engaged in
Afghanistan. 64 In the economic arena the emphasis had
shifted from financial support to technical services and
training. There were 2,000 Soviet economic personnel to take
over managerial jobs in Afghanistan. The Taraki government
signed 60 odd contracts that had been already negotiated with
the predecessor government. 6 -* The contracts were valued at
$200 million. Among the contracts signed were agreements
for:
A $50 million rail and vehicle bridge over the
Amu Darya River at Hairatan, the first direct
connection between Afghanistan and the USSR.
$30 million worth of petroleum equipment to be
provided in 1979 and 1980.
Studies and designs for the $600 million Ainak
copper smelter and for a 300,000 ton fertilizer
plant near the existing Soviet built plant at
Mazar-i-Sharif
.
A $22 million seven-year project for mapping
modern Afghanistan.
A $5 million renovation of the Sher Khan river
port, to increase its handling capacity to 2,500
tons of cargo annually. 66
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On December 5, 1978 the two countries also signed a
twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was
later used as a justification for the Soviet invasion.
According to its Article 4 which contains a security
commitment:
The high contracting parties, acting in a spirit of
friendship and good-neighborliness, as well as in
spirit of the UN Charter, will hold consultations
and, with the agreement of both parties, take
appropriate measures with a view to ensuring the
security, independence, aid territorial integrity
of the two countries.
In the interests of strengthening the defense
capability of the high contracting parties, they
will continue to develop cooperation in the
military field on the basis cjf appropriate
agreements concluded between them. '
The rule by Taraki government was replete with internal
dissension. The regime envisioned an overnight modernization
of Afghanistan and therefore it introduced new laws
pertaining to land reforms, rural credit, marriage
arrangements and education. All these radical reforms
provoked a country wide resistance. The 'marriage of
convenience' that had been forged between the Khalq and
Parcham factions prior to the overthrow of Daoud was over.
The Khalq government had by July 1978 begun to purge the
Parchamites. It is estimated that about 800 people in the
military belonging to the Parcham faction were purged.
Babrak Karmal was sent to Czechoslovakia as an ambassador,
his brother Mohammad Barialy to Pakistan, and Nur Ahmed Nur
to Washington. Major General Abdul Qader and Sultan Ali
Keshtmand, the minister of planning, were arrested for
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conspiring against the government and were subsequently given
death sentences. About 20,000 political prisoners were said
to have been killed from April 1978 through December 1979. 68
The resistance movement comprising of "religious reformists,
social democrats, tribal autonomists and Afghan
nationalists," 69 was accelerated when Taraki changed the
color of the flag from traditional Islamic green to red. The
radical policies ensued by Taraki government were not looked
upon favorably by the Soviets who advocated 'go slow' policy.
During this period Hafizullah Amin who had a Prime Minister
portfolio emerged as a strong man and on September 16, 1979
after Taraki's futile attempt to have him killed, Amin got
Taraki assassinated.
Amin, often alleged by the Soviets, to be a CIA man was
interested in following an independent policy both in
domestic and foreign affairs, rather than toing the Soviet
line. In a question about his relationship with the Soviet
government, Amin had remarked, "It is like the relationship
between two equal brothers. But I have declared repeatedly
that our actions are not dictated by anyone." 70 Perhaps it
was this relationship of equality which the Soviets found so
unpalatable and was later the cause of his ouster from the
office.
As the internal insurgency mounted, Moscow grew anxious
about the fate of Afghanistan and decided to send in April
1979, General Aleksei Yepishev, the head of the Soviet army
40
to study the growing insurrection in Afghanistan. 71 By mid-
August with the deterioration of the military position, the
Soviets sent another mission to Afghanistan headed by General
Ivan G. Paulovsky to study the rapidly deteriorating
situation, '• whose assessment it is believed played an
instrumental role in determining Moscow's decision to
73invade. J The Soviet stakes in Afghanistan were in a serious
jeopardy. Execution and imprisonments were rampant
throughout the country. Draft evasions and defection to
rebel forces were widespread. Worst of all the Soviets were
not in a position to influence Amin's government or sizeable
presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In order to avoid
embarrassment which would naturally follow from the collapse
of the Marxist government in Kabul, the Soviets felt limited
to three options: To leave Amin in office, but that was
inconceivable given the chaotic state of the country. The
Soviets feared that if the Marxist government fell, the
Soviet investment would be lost and the West could be
expected to move in, following the Soviet's departure. 4
Second, to retreat and cut their losses but that would have
put anti-Afghan rebels in a position to seize power. The
last option was to oust Amin and install a puppet government
in Kabul. Such a scenario Soviets hoped would restore
stability to the country and put the Soviet Union in a
stronger position to capitalize on unpredictable events in
Iran and also further the Soviet goals in the Middle East. 75
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Thus on December 24, 1979 the Soviets began the airlift
which brought the 105— Soviet Army Airborne Guards Division
to land at Kabul airport. Similar airborne troops landed at
Bagram Air Base near Kabul, and Shindand and Kandahar air
bases were captured by land forces. And by the morning of
Thursday, December 27, 1979 the Soviets were in full control.
Finally Amin was killed in the palace and Babrak Karmal, a
servile follower of the Soviet Union proclaimed himself to be
the new head of the government. Thus, the Soviets had by now
succeeded in launching the 'fourth invasion* of Afghanistan.
It is believed that the Soviet Union's decision-makers
were divided on whether to invade Afghanistan or not. It is
speculated that the decision to invade was forced upon the
aging and ailing Soviet leader Lenoid Brezhnev. Brezhnev had
already staked his leadership in detente when he invited
Nixon to visit Moscow in 1972. In discussing the Central
Committee meeting of May 1972, which approved Nixon's visit
despite the course of the war in Vietnam, Brezhnev felt
that there was opposition to Nixon's visit. 7 ^ In the final
poll of the Politburo Pyotr Shelest, the Ukrainian party
chief and anti-west hardliner urged that the summit be
cancelled. He remained adamant in his opposition to Nixon's
visit:
"I won't shake a hand bloodied in Vietnam," he
reportedly said. Brezhnev turned to Vladimir
Scherbitsky, a Ukrainian and. junior to Shelest, "do
you agree with comrade Pyotr Shelest." "No I don't
agree," said Scherbitsky, "the President is welcome
in the Ukraine." Now Brezhnev addressed Shelest.
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"You see, you can speak for yourself comrade, but
you can't speak for all Ukrainians."
With this statement Shelest's fate was sealed and he was
removed from the Politburo. Thus, Brezhnev's prestige was so
intertwined with detente that some analysts believe that the
7 ftinvasion of Afghanistan was a plot to discredit him. ° While
on the other hand there are analysts who do not concur with
this reasoning and assert that Brezhnev was equally
supportive of this invasion. According to Joseph Collins:
The Politburo member to vigorously support the
invasion was Brezhnev himself on January 13. 9 He
had no choice but to send troops. And events have
confirmed that this was the only correct
decision. 80
AN ANALYSES OF NATIONAL INTERESTS BEHIND THE INVASION; -
What were the factors which induced the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan? According to the Soviets they had been
invited by the government of Afghanistan under the terms of
1978 treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, to assist the
Afghans in repelling outside intervention. By 'outside
intervention' the Soviet Union implied assistance to the
guerrilla movement from the United States, Pakistan and
China. This explanation however, cannot be accepted because
there was no evidence to prove that the U.S., Pakistan and
China had intervened military and in fact by that time the
Soviets themselves had entered Kabul. 8 1
Besides this some other factors worth consideration are:
the United States, Peoples Republic of China, Warm water
ports, the Gulf Oil, the Islamic Threat and the Russian
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Soviet Imperialistic tendencies.
UNITED STATES - the credibility gap:
Although the United States credibility as a dominant
power had considerably eroded as a result of its bitter
involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. policies were seriously
endangered during the latter part of the 1970s, not in
Southeast Asia but rather in the South, Southwest Asian
region with the makings of the Iranian Islamic revolution and
subseguent hostage crisis in Iran in November 1979. During
this crisis the Soviet Union speculated that the United
States might resort to military retaliation to seek the
release of American hostages in Iran. Such a maneuver could
establish the U.S. military presence in Iran which would have
obvious conseguences for the Soviet border concerns and its
own expansionist policies in the Gulf region. The Soviets
manipulated this situation in their own favor by launching a
propaganda campaign on American military preparations in Iran
by prolonging the hostage crisis. Their motive was to divert
world attention from Afghanistan "while Soviet decision
makers finalized contingency invasion plans." " As Andrei
Sakharov remarked, "The Soviet leaders chose this movement to
act because, with the U.S. preoccupied with Iran and other
problems, they judged the correlation of military and
political forces to be in their favor." 83
Afghanistan was gained by the Soviet Union as a result
of the failing deterrence by America. The Soviet Union felt
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confident that there would be no retaliation from the U.S.
and its allies, ". . . such is America's weakness of will and
of strategic direction these days it (the USSR) would get
ft 4
away with its act of contempt. ^ Occupation of Afghanistan
was the result when appeals of American Ambassadors in Kabul
were signed by Congressional Committees and a Vietnam-
defensive administration. 5
UNITED STATES The failing detente:
By 1979 the U.S.-Soviet relations had considerably
deteriorated. " This deterioration began in 1978 "with the
NATO countries decision for 3 percent real growth in their
defense budgets and continued through the formation of the
ft fiRapid Deployment Force." In addition the Salt II agreement
was being opposed by some hardliners in the U.S. government.
According to V. Fedin first deputy of International
Information Department of the Central committee, "Carter has
ft 7done everything to sabotage the agreement." Since the
detente had been seriously damaged, the Soviets came to
believe that as they had nothing more to lose as for the
relations with the adversary (the U.S.) were concerned,
therefore, the time was most appropriate to launch an
invasion of Afghanistan.
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA :
Sino-Soviet relations had begun to deteriorate with
China's invasion of Vietnam. With the post-Mao government in
China, Soviet Union made several attempts for approachment
45
but there seemed no change in Peking's anti-Soviet attitude.
Peking was believed "to have rebuffed both public and private
Soviet initiatives for relaxing tensions to the Soviet Union
across the fortified border." 88 This threat was intensified
further as a result of China's continued cooperation with
Pakistan for the construction of the Karakoram Highway. The
relations were further exacerbated when the Peoples Republic
of China in April 1979, made the announcement of not renewing
the 1959 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Alliance. 89 Also
because of the growing Chinese influence in Iran, Pakistan
and Afghanistan, the Soviets decided to put an end to this
for once and for all.
Thus, the Soviet Union, by intervening in Afghanistan
before China could avail the opportunity to contemplate any
long term policies to increase its role in Afghanistan,
succeeded in eliminating the Chinese influence from
Afghanistan completely.
WARM WATER PORTS ;
Another national interest which may have figured
prominently in the Soviet policy deliberations to invade
Afghanistan was the age old desire of Russians and Soviets to
have an access to warm water ports of the Arabian Sea.
The Arabian Seaport towns of Chah-Bahar in Iran and
Gwadar in Pakistan lie about 300 miles south of the
Afghan border, in a region dominated by Baluchi
tribesmen disaffected from both Tehran and
Islamabad. Baluchistan, convulsed by a breaking
rebellion from 1973 to 1977, has always been a
tempting target for a Soviet gateway to the sea. 90
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The invasion of Afghanistan, has thus, provided the
Soviet Union with the corridor to reach warm water ports of
the Indian Ocean, a goal that has previously eluded the
Soviets for a long time.
THE PERSIAN GULF :
"The area south of Bahin and Baku, in the general
direction of the Persian Gulf is . . . .the Center
of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." 91
This statement made approximately four decades prior to
1979 by V.M. Molotov in 1940, is a true reflection of the
policies the Soviet Union had in mind. For the
implementation of those policies, the time had to be right
but with the invasion of Afghanistan the Soviets had been
granted with right time. Moscow's long awaited goal:
control of the oil flow could be possible now.
But I do not intend to imply here that the Persian Gulf
oil factor was the only primary objective of the Soviet Union
that lay behind the invasion. But it certainly has provided
the Soviets an opportunity to be in close proximity with the
Strait of Hormuz and who knows when they might take advantage
of it. The control of the gulf oil could place Western
Europe, Japan, the U.S. and many other countries in
vulnerable positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
AFGHANISTAN'S OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RESOURCES :
Afghanistan's rich deposits of oil, gas and mineral
resources deserve some attention as possible incentives for
the Soviets to decide in favor of the 1979 invasion. During
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the period 1974-76 oil deposits were discovered in Jarqudog,
Augoot, Sai-i-Pul of Joozjan province and Aligul of Oraysar
Faryab province. * Not only was Afghanistan rich in oil but
it also had natural gas resources which too like oil were
exploited by the Soviets. It is believed that prior to the
official export of gas to the Soviet Union in 1968, 25
million cubic meters worth of natural gas had already been
exported to the Soviet Union in the year 1967 alone. 3
Later, pipelines were also constructed by the Soviet Union
for the export of gas from Afghanistan to the USSR. Besides
oil and gas huge deposits of minerals like copper, bauxite,
beryl, iron ore, fluorspar, coal and chrome were found by the
Soviet experts years ago in Afghanistan. 94 In June 1977, an
agreement was signed by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan for
the technical and economic survey of a copper melting plant
which was to cost 1.5 million rubles. But this agreement was
never materialized.
*
Thus, Afghanistan rich in natural resources was the most
attractive prey for the Soviets to devour.
ISLAMIC THREAT ;
Afghanistan lies in close proximity with three Soviet
Central Asian republics Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Tadzhikstan
with which it shares a border of 800 miles. These three
republics are not only predominantely muslim but also have a
high rate of growth and share overlapping ethnic ties with
Afghanistan. 6 Given such a demographic and ethnic trend the
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fundamentalist Islamic revival in Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey
and Pakistan was obviously a matter of concern to the
Soviets. For instance the 1978, a Tajik uprising against
Russians in Dushanbe was the kind of crisis the Soviets
wanted to avoid in the future. The Soviets were cognizant of
the fact that the Islamic revivalism in Afghanistan might
have a spill over effect in Central Asian Republics, which
share ethnic and linguistic bonds with Afghanistan. Such a
scenario could trigger off a chain reaction of separatist
impulses among the 50 million Soviet muslims, a situation the
Soviets would do anything to avoid. Since the Shiite Muslim
revivalism in Iran after the fall of the Shah had already
created great concerns for the Muslim population in
Turkemenistan, the Soviets did not want to see Afghanistan
too, being lost to Islamic revivalism.
Some scholars tend to believe that concern for the
Islamic threat did not loom large in the Soviet's decision to
invade Afghanistan. I however do not concur with their
analyses because throughout the long course of USSR's history
the muslims and non-muslim Russians have always been at odds
with each other. While one advancing and forcefully annexing
Muslim territories, the other trying to check these advances.
Thus, both the Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Russia
invariably succeeded in breaking up the Muslim community and
creating new nations out of the debris of the Muslim Ummah.
To sum up, the Russian move in Afghanistan was
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determined by all the aforementioned factors. These factors
were designed to strengthen and promote the security of the
Soviet frontiers and strategic goals. This objective was to
be achieved only through the neutralization of this region
i.e., denial of political and strategic accessibility in this
region to other powers. And control of Afghanistan by the
Soviets is an important determinant in this scheme leading to
their eventual hegemony over this region.
The Soviet Union is interested to have a compliant
Afghan regime. The continuation of a 1978 treaty
establishing a Finland-style security relationship between
Moscow and Kabul remains a non-negotiable Soviet demand. The
Soviet Union envisages to withdraw its forces but because of
its heavy military investment in Afghanistan, it would like
to leave in place the Soviet sponsored Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA).
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2. UNITED STATES' CHANGING PERSPECTIVES OF SODTH ASIA
In this chapter I intend to examine the U.S. strategic
perspectives in South/Southwest Asia, especially in the wake
of the Afghanistan crisis so that the area of negotiation
could be discerned. After examining the U.S. shift from
Europe as an area of focus to South Asia, this chapter will
attempt to answer a few of the important questions being
asked in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis. Those questions
are as follows:
(1) Why United States has become again interested in
the policy which it allegedly ignored at the start
of the 1960s?
(2) Why Pakistan has suddenly emerged as an important
nation to secure the national interest of United
States?
The U.S. policies toward South Asia were characterized
by a certain degree of inconsistency, especially towards two
important regional countries, namely, Pakistan and India.
Quite often one gained importance in the eyes of the U.S.
policymakers at the expense of the other. This
inconsistency, in turn, was determined by the changing U.S.
perceptions of its interests in the Gulf Oil region and Indo-
china. No independent policy was formulated for South Asia,
a region in which United States had only a marginal interest;
but its location was accentuated by its close proximity to
two areas of U.S. vital interests: Southwest Asia and
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Southeast Asia. The U.S. South Asian policy always remained
a component of the greater U.S. policy designed to contain
communism. The advent of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979 signaled a change in United States South Asian
policies. And once again this region, especially Pakistan,-
began to loom large in United States foreign policy
deliberations. It is this theme that I will expand upon by
the use of several anecdotes for the illustration of my main
points.
While the U.S. was embroiled in the cold war with the
U.S. in Europe, it paid little attention to South Asia.
Conseguently, South Asia was put on a back burner as far as
the long list of U.S. priorities and policies were concerned.
It was in 1947 that India gained independence from
British rule and was partitioned to create Pakistan. Both
India and Pakistan soon after their independence became
embroiled in the Kashmir dispute, with each seeking to
establish its suzerainty over the disputed territory. By
1949 a momentous development took place in Asia: the defeat
of Chiang Kai-Shek and the subsequent communist take over of
the government in China. This development soon shifted
United States focus from Europe to South Asia, and the U.S.
began to make overtures to India with the objective of
formulating an alliance to contain China. The U.S. wanted to
present India as a counterpoise to China. With this end in
mind the Truman administration extended an invitation to
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Jawahar Lai Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, to visit the
U.S. Nehru's charismatic personality even prior to his visit
had made a profound impact on the American public, who
eagerly awaited his arrival. The announcement of the
invitation to Nehru caused a deep concern in Karachi 1
, since
no similar invitation had been extended to the Pakistani
Premier Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.
Nehru's visit to the U.S. did not reap the results that
were anticipated by Washington. Nehru maintained his
nonaligned stance and refused to take sides in the cold war.
Thus, his visit was a disappointment to the U.S. leaders who
had hoped that he might endorse their policy against China.
After having been convinced that no cooperation could be
expected from the Indian Prime Minister, the U.S. turned to
Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the U.S. in 1950
marked the beginning of an alliance relationship between the
two countries; and Pakistan came to be known as the most
allied ally of the U.S. in the years that followed.
Pakistan's meager resources and its dire need for an
immediate buildup of its dilapidated military to counter
hostile neighbors India (Kashmir dispute) and Afghanistan
(Durand Line) persuaded it to seek a security alliance.
There were many reasons why Pakistan turned to the U.S. and
not to the Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Union's Marxist
ideology was inimical to Pakistan's Islamic orientation.
Second, the bureaucracy or the decision making body in
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Pakistan was Western oriented, eager to steer Pakistan's
foreign policy in the direction of the U.S. Some of the
notable personalities that constituted this group were Sir
Zafarullah Khan, Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, Mohammad
Ali Bogra and Ayub Khan. The third factor was United States
technological advancement in the post-World War II era; it
had emerged as scientifically the most advanced country in
the new international system. Pakistan decided to procure
technical assistance from the U.S. because of Pakistan's
skepticism about the Soviet ability to provide both material
and technical aid. 2 Finally, the Kashmir dispute also paved
the way for a closer relationship with the U.S. Since the
Kashmir dispute was pending in the UN, Pakistan was quick to
realize that it was important to enlist the support of the
Western bloc that enjoyed a far greater majority in the UN
than the Soviet bloc. 3
With the outbreak of the Korean war and Indo-China war
and as a result of British promptings, the U.S. came to
realize Pakistan's strategic position. Pakistan with its
western wing in close proximity to the Muslim world and the
eastern wing adjacent to Southeast Asia began to figure
prominently in the U.S. foreign policy. For the U.S.
policymakers Pakistan was intrinsically linked to the defense
of the middle east, the oil resources which were of crucial
importance to the U.S. Therefore, the National Security
Council had begun to formulate plans for the Western
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organized defense of the Middle East at the behest of George
McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State, who had emphasized
the role Pakistan could play in this defense strategy:
Pakistan wants to play a role in the Middle East .
. . They would do almost anything if the Kashmir
problem could be settled. Liaquat is strongly on
our side
. . . Pakistanis are good fighters and
they can raise almost any number of men. Again . .
. there is an equipment problem to be solved. With
Pakistan the Middle East could be defended; without
Pakistan, I don't see any way to defend the Middle
East. 4
By 1953, Karachi, Moscow and Washington were being led
by new leaders viz., Mohammad Ali Bogra, Khruschev and
Eisenhower. It was as a member of the Eisenhower
Administration that John Foster Dulles began to give shape to
the U.S. foreign policy. He belonged to the generation of
Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk and George F. Kennan, who viewed
communism to be an evil force and therefore a growing menace,
the containment of which was important. Dulles had always
been considered to have engineered alliances and pacts
between the U.S. and other states. But the fact of the
matter is that the foundation of forming alliances had been
laid by the Truman administration, 5 in pursuit of the
doctrine of containment. Nevertheless, Dulles played an
important role in the consummation of the 1954 pact with
Pakistan. He developed the idea of northern tier which
proposed an alliance to be formed of the front line states of
the Middle East particularly those lying in close proximity
to the Soviet Union. 6 He pointed to Pakistan's and Turkey's
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positions on the map while testifying before the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and declared that these
two countries could be the two very strong bulwarks to thwart
Soviet communism's extension.
The proposal for the 'northern tier', collective
security was suggested as an alternative to the Middle East
Defense Organization (MEDO) by the Eisenhower administration
especially after having realized that the Middle Eastern
threat perception did not converge with those of Washington.
These countries were so embroiled in "their quarrels with
Israel or Great Britain or France that they" paid, "little
heed to the menace of Soviet communism." 8 As a result of
differing perceptions, the U.S. government decided to endorse
the northern tier security concept proposed by Dulles who was
convinced that the large coalitions in the form of collective
security could defeat the forces of evil, as they had done
during the two Great Wars. 9
An innovation was made by the Eisenhower administration
in the northern tier concept which was to later have profound
implications for Pakistan in her relations with India and the
Soviet Union. This new policy spelled out United States
desire to acquire overseas bases which could be used against
the USSR and be important in the conduct of United States
military operations on the European continent in case of
general war. 10
So far Pakistan had proven to be an avowed supporter of
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the West, as had been quite evident by the zealous support
given to the U.S. in the Korean War and the Japanese Peace
Treaty. After having been convinced of Pakistan's future
support in thwarting the communist ambitions the U.S. decided
to enter into a US-Pak Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in
1954. Under the terms of this agreement the United States
was to give military equipment and training to the Pakistani
armed forces. 11 This agreement, it was decided, would not be
viewed as a military alliance nor any military bases in
Pakistan would be made available to the U.S. 12 But this
policy was soon repudiated by the U.S. when they initiated a
search for base facilities in the adjoining or neighboring
countries of the Soviet Union. These base facilities were to
accomplish for the U.S. regular aerial surveillance of the
Soviet Union. The country selected for this purpose was
Pakistan. The old ceiling of $171 million dollars under the
Mutual Defense Agreement being provided to Pakistan was
scrapped-*--' in favor of enhanced assistance so that Pakistan
would easily acquiesce to the U.S. demand for bases. It was
in 1959 that the U.S. and Pakistan entered into a Bilateral
Agreement of Cooperation, under which Pakistan agreed to
provide base facilities to the U.S. 14
The granting of base near Peshawar proved fateful to
Pakistan when in 1960 a U.S. reconnaissance plane (U-2)
crossed the Soviet territory and was shot down by a rocket.
This incident exasperated the Soviets to such an extent that
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Khruschev was provoked to threaten Pakistan when he said that
if such an incident was repeated, Peshawar would be wiped out
from the face of the earth. Grant of base facilities to the
United States did not only incur the wrath of the Soviets but
also adversely affected Indo-Pak relations. For India
continued to suspect that the military arsenal being procured
by Pakistan would be used against India.
The notion of collective defense expounded by John
Foster Dulles led to the formation of SEATO (1954) and CENTO
(1955) with the sole motive of containing the two communist
giants: the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan became a
member of both SEATO and CENTO and thus Dulles's prediction
came true: as Turkey a member of NATO and CENTO soon formed
one end of a chain and Pakistan, (a CENTO member) along with
the other Southeast Asian members of SEATO, formed the other
end thus successfully encircling the two communist countries
with India as a notable gap in the chain. Pakistan joined
these alliances with certain expectations which did not yield
the anticipated results. At the very outset of these
alliances United States had, on a number of several
occasions, unambiguously informed Pakistan that the military
assistance under these alliances would be forthcoming only in
case of communist aggression. Pakistan had been
categorically informed that no assistance would be extended
in case of its war with India. This seemed unpalatable to
Pakistani decision makers who perceived threat from India
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rather than the Communist world, whereas it was the other way
around for the U.S. The United States had no wish to become
involved in the conflicts between the two South Asian states
because it was quite engrossed in containing the USSR and
China and felt no desire to win the hostility of India too.
Therefore, the United States quite prudently did not extend
the term aggression to include Indian aggression too, much to
the dismay of Pakistan.
Two significant events marked a shift in the U.S.
policies towards Pakistan. First was the death of John
Foster Dulles in 1959, the founder of northern tier concept;
with him gone, the whole idea of northern tier came under
review by the Eisenhower administration. The second was the
change of leadership in the White House. Under the
administration of President John F. Kennedy, the whole U.S.
policy toward South Asia was revised. Now their focus was on
India rather than on Pakistan. India was perceived as "the
pre-eminent South Asian state stable, democratic and a
logical ally", 15 of the U.S. in containing the People's
Republic of China who by involvement in the Korean and
Vietnam war had been projected to the U.S. as an expansionist
state.
The first test of Pak-U.S. relations came in 1965 during
the Indo-Pak war, when the U.S. decided to terminate the
supply of arms to both India and Pakistan. This policy hurt
Pakistan more than it did India, because for Pakistan the
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only donor of arms was the United States whereas India was
not only receiving arms from the U.S. and the USSR but was
also manufacturing certain types of arms. 16
The nadir of U.S. policy toward South Asia was reached
in the late 60s early 70s. This happened when South Asia
began to slide away from the U.S. list of priorities as is
evident by the degree of economic and military assistance
proffered by the United States to the countries of the
region. The military assistance was substantially reduced
and so was the economic assistance under the assumption that
the underdeveloped countries could not progress at a rate
regarded as satisfactory. 17 Another assumption was that
India and Pakistan are less important than once considered
and capable enough to fight communist aggression. 18 Still
another factor which might have influenced Washington in
playing a reduced role is the thawing of relations with
China. After this rapprochement, the U.S. felt it had been
relieved of one source of tension in this region and could
quite competently tackle the other source—the Soviet Union.
The lowest ebb in Pak-U.S. relations was reached during
the Carter administration when the U.S. embassy and cultural
centers were burned by the mob, protesting the attack on
Kabah (the muslims holy place in Mecca). The attack was made
by the dissident Saudis on the fourteen hundredth anniversary
of the Prophet Mohammad's death and rumors circulated in
Pakistan that the United States was involved in this attack.
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Carter administration's policy was akin to that of Kennedy's
in giving India priority over Pakistan and expecting India to
play the role of a regional policeman, thus relieving U.S.
from its arduous task of maintaining stability in the region.
This policy was most unequivocally spelled out by Professor
Thomas Thornton who was then the member of National Security
Council staff in the Carter administration. In his comments
on Mrs. Gandhis' expected visit to Washington, he remarked:
A strong India, playing a responsible regional
role, would relieve U.S. of the need to do so and
even have some stabilizing effect on the
neighboring Southeast Asia and Persian Gulf
regions. It is sobering to consider the problems
we would face if India were weak and divided or
aligned with the Soviet Union. 19
Thus the Democratic party that came to power in 1977
recognized India as a growing power and expected it to play a
hegemonic role in South/Southwest Asia. They had already
declared in their party platform: "India has now achieved a
considerable degree of hegemony over the sub-continent . . .
future American policy should accept this fact." 20 The
American tilt towards India under the Carter Administration
greatly shifted the balance of power to India's advantage.
Respect for Human Rights and the Nuclear Non-
proliferation issues were the two dominant themes of the
Carter era. Pakistan on several occasions was urged by the
U.S. for the restoration of full civil liberties and
democracy in the country. The Human Rights constituted an
important element in the overall U.S. foreign policy which
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determined its relations with the countries of the globe.
But the U.S. policy makers did not strictly adhere to it as a
criterion for setting standards of friendship because had
that been the case it is very unlikely that the relationship
between the U.S. and Pakistan, no matter how lukewarm, would
have ever existed. As Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance
remarked that from the human rights perspective, the entire
range of countries in South and Southwest Asia would have to
be written off, for if the United States bases it relations
with other states on the existence of human rights in those
states, then not a single country in the region would
qualify. 21
During the Carter era, the issue of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation formed the cornerstone of the U.S. policy
toward the South/Southwest Asian region. The Carter
Administration followed a biased approach on the issue of
nuclear technology. While cracking down on Pakistan's
efforts to acquire nuclear technology, the U.S. provided
India with the nuclear fuel for its atomic reactor at
Tarapur. Pakistan's persistence in acquiring nuclear
technology proved fatal to its economic development. It not
only terminated the U.S. economic aid to Pakistan but the
Carter administration also succeeded in influencing the
financial houses like the IBRD (World Bank) and IMF to follow
suit. Furthermore, the United States government also
succeeded in dissuading the French government from providing
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the much desired reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Moreover,
the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is
reported to have remarked that if Premier Bhutto was to
pursue acquiring nuclear technology the U.S. would make a
horrible example of him. 22
Thus, this was the nature of the relationship, if any,
between Pakistan and the United States at the advent of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. policies in this
region since the post world war II era had greatly
fluctuated—from a region that occupied highest to the lowest
set of U.S. priorities. South Asia was regarded as a link
between Southwest and Southeast Asia, the two regions where
the U.S. had major strategic interests. Throughout the
course of its South Asian policy United States made a
concerted effort to refrain from entanglements in the
regional conflicts between the two major powers of the
region, thus indirectly seeking to encourage India to
exercise considerable leverage over Pakistan.
The United States however changed its pattern of
behavior in South Asia after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979; and this region once again occupied top
priority in the U.S. foreign policy making agenda. The
question arises, what induced the U.S. to revert to the
policies of the 50s that had been so brusquely abandoned in
the 60s? The answer to this can be found in President Jimmy
Carter's State of the Union address of January 1980 in which
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he expressed his concern about the threat the invasion of
Afghanistan entailed to the United States 'vital interests'
(which later came to be known as the Carter Doctrine). "An
attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America. And such an
assault will be repelled by any means necessary including
military force." 23 It was the safeguard of the vital
interests of the U.S. which provided the framework on which
the U.S. policy began to take shape in the subsequent years.
Before getting into a great detail about how the United
States perceives the security of its vital interests it is
important to identify and explain the terminology 'vital
interests' from the U.S. perspective. The areas of vital
interest lie in the Southwest Asian region, the most
important being the security of the state of Israel and the
Gulf. United States realizes that the Soviet access to the
Indian Ocean would tighten the Soviet control over the Gulf
oil. and also deprive it (the U.S.) of potential future
influence in the Middle East conflict. The oil embargo of
1973 highlighted the intensity of Western economic dependence
on the Middle East oil, after which it was realized that the
protection of the Gulf Oil region is vital for the economies
of Japan and Western states which are solely dependent on
Mideast oil. ".
. . Japan is entirely dependent on imported
oil, 75 percent of which is purchased in the Gulf; and the
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U.S. is some 45 percent dependent on imported oil, about 30
percent of which is purchased from the Gulf." 24 The United
States is not solely dependent on the Gulf oil; other
exporters of oil to United States are Mexico and Nigeria.
Reduced oil reserves or denial of access to oil by
either the Soviet Union or by the Middle Eastern states to
Japan and Western countries poses a threat to the U.S. Such
a scenario will place the United States in a tough
competition with other recipients for oil supplies.
Therefore, the United States considers the security of the
Gulf to be of paramount importance and to be taken seriously.
The other important concern of vital interest to United
States within Southwest Asia is to ensure the security of the
State of Israel. In order to promote and maintain its
influence in the Middle East, the United States is dependent
on Israel, the continued existence of which can help the
United States achieve its objective. One of the reasons the
United States has assigned this role to Israel rather than
the Arab states is because the latter are quite vulnerable to
increased radicalization in the region, a situation which
would greatly threaten U.S. interests. The United States
feels certain that the State of Israel is the only country
which can safeguard U.S. strategic interests in the region.
Keeping the vital interests of the U.S. in mind, it is
easy to understand the importance of renewed relationship
with Pakistan. The first U.S. attempt to renew closer ties
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with Pakistan was made in late 1979, after the invasion of
Afghanistan. In order to strengthen Pakistan as a bulwark
against the Soviet Union's expansionism, the Carter
Administration made a modest offer ($400 million) of
assistance*-^ to Pakistan, which was rejected by President
Zia-ul-Haq, who referred to it as an offer of 'peanuts'.
Later, another offer of assistance to Pakistan in the amount
of $3.2 billion was made by the Reagan Administration, which
was accepted by Zia's government; again the package was half
ESF. This was a multi-year package of economic assistance
and arms sale which also included the sale of forty F-16
fighter bombers. In the wake of Afghan crisis, United States
considered it most pragmatic to turn to Pakistan in search of
allies in this region. The existence of strong regional
allies is important for the promotion of United States
interests because it would otherwise be difficult for it to
intervene militarily. The need to have Pakistan as its
proxy became even more urgent especially after United States
had lost Iran , an avowed supporter of its strategic
interests.
Thus, the U.S. policy towards South Asia has been
steered by the United States* changing perceptions of its
global geopolitical and strategic goals. These changing
perceptions have in turn affected the importance of this
region, which has been fluctuating from a low priority area
to an area of great relevance to U.S. 'vital interests'.
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3. POLITICS OF AN EXPATRIATE NATION
The migration of Afghan refugees had begun with the 1978
coup and had increased after the post 1978 coup civil war
began. But when the Soviets entered Afghanistan it totally
disturbed the political equilibrium and precluded any
possibility of restoration of equilibrium. About more than
3.2 million refugees came to Pakistan; a million went to Iran
and created an expatriate force outside the country.
Expatriate populations have become an important factor,
influencing political development in many parts of the world.
There are two important features of the politics of the
expatriate population which will be discussed in this
chapter. One is that they have always been created when some
sympathy exists for them and for the cause which renders them
homeless in the first place. For example, the Afghan
refugees fled to Pakistan because people of the same ethnic
stock lived in Pakistan. Second, the expatriate populations
tend to be much more conservative in the sense of wanting the
restoration of the status quo ante. There are instances of
these kinds of expatriates all over the world, for example
Cubans and Nicaraguans in Miami, Sikhs in Canada,
Bangladeshis in West Bengal, Ethiopians in Somalia, Tamils in
South India. Wherever such pools of expatriates have been
created they have tended to make settlement of disputes more
difficult because of their more conservative approach toward
the settlement of disputes. For instance, expatriate Sikhs
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are said to be the main stumbling block for the moderate
members of their own community in India in the latter's stand
for a solution to their problem. This is also the case with
Afghan resistance groups, bedeviled by their internal feuds
have complicated the settlement issue. By identifying
different resistance groups and the nature of their
differences this important impediment to the resolution of
the Afghan crisis can be explored. This approach has not
been previously adopted.
Before we proceed with the classification of different
ethnic groups it is important to briefly discuss
Afghanistan's ethnic and linguistic fragmentation. This
ethnic fragmentation would help us to discern the ethnic
propensities of various groups and also explain why it has
been difficult for them to unify and adopt a common approach.
Ethnically, the people of Afghanistan primarily belong
to two different groups: Indo-Europeans of a Mediterranean
type (the Pushtuns, Tajiks, Nuristanis and Baluchis) and
Turco-Mongolians (the Hazaras, Turkoman, Uzbek, Aimeq and
Kirghiz groups). A third group, the Dravidian Brahuis, form
a very small part of the population. 1
Although different ethnic groups in Afghanistan differ
from one another in terms of language, culture and physical
characteristics; they share a great deal in common. Nearly
all the Afghan ethnic groups have the same lifestyles and
occupational patterns. 2 Very few of its ethnic groups are
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indigenous. Pushtuns for example, are not all Afghans; there
is a large number who live in the adjoining areas of
Pakistan.
The Pushtuns have been the most dominant group in
Afghanistan. They numbered about 6,500,000 in 1979. 3 Until
1979, the Pushtuns were fully in control of modern
Afghanistan's political institutions; they (the Durrani clan)
constituted the royal family. Other important political and
bureaucratic positions were filled in by the Pushtuns, which
resulted in resentment against them by other ethnic groups.
These tribal people are Sunni Muslims and speak Pushto.
The second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan is made
up of the Tajiks, who speak Dari. A great majority of them
have been sedentary cultivators or townsmen. They have
continuously been overrun by the intruders including
Pushtuns.
Nuristanis are said to be the descendants of Alexander
the Great's soldiers. They live in the mountainous areas
north of Kabul. They were converted to Islam from polytheism
in the late nineteenth century. Nuristanis have had a long
history of friction with the Pushtuns because of the latter's
control over provincial and central government. Nuristanis
speak Dari and are Sunni Muslims.
The Baluchis live in the southwestern desert region and
speak a language related to Persian. These Sunni nomads are
also found in Pakistan and Iran.
82
Among the Turco-Mongolians are Hazaras. They are Shiite
Muslims who live in the Hindu Rush; they speak Hazarigi, a
language similar to Dari. Turkomen live in the northwestern
steppes of Afghanistan and speak a language related to
Turkish. They come from Soviet Turkomen.
Another important group is the Uzbeks who are spread
across the northern plain from Kunduz to Maimana as farmers
and seminomads. Their major urban center is the Mazari-i-
Sharif. Aimeqs are Sunni muslims who speak Dari and are
found in the west of Hazarajat province. Finally, Kirghiz
are the refugees from Soviet Russia.
Whenever two or more political systems contiguous to one
another exist, they often share a common ethnic group which
is linguistically, religiously or culturally identifiable.
In such situations, in the country or countries in which the
ethnic is a minority, the group is conscious if its cultural
affinities with the brethren in the adjoining country, as is
the case with Afghan refugees. Since tribes of the same
ethnic group have lived on both sides of the Durand line,
there has existed for centuries relatively unrestricted
movement of these people back and forth across the frontier. 4
About ninety percent of the Afghan refugees who have
come to Pakistan are Pushtun and belong to the provinces of
Kunar, Nangrahar, Pakia, Ghazni, Badakhashan, Logar and
Kandahar 5
. These areas are geographically contiguous to
Pakistan. The reason they have been successful in fleeing to
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Pakistan is because the rugged terrain has made it difficult
for the Soviets to prevent their exodus and for the Pakistani
authorities to seal off the frontier effectively. Thus the
tribal affinities between the Pathans/Pushtuns of Pakistan
and Afghanistan provided the Afghan refugees with a strong
incentive to seek refuge in Pakistan. This could have been
difficult, if the Pakistani Pushtuns had not empathized with
their (the refugees) plight. This migration of refugees to
Pakistan led to the reinforcement of expatriate politics with
the help of the influence of their Pakistani Pushtun
brethrens. This has created a kind of an inter-relationship
between the expatriate population and population of the
ethnic stock. Migrating to Pakistan has meant that some of
their own predilections have been reinforced. For instance,
Pakistan's Islamic stance has reinforced the Islamic
disposition of certain groups such as Jamiat-i-Islami and
Hezb-i-Islami. The idea of emphasis of the creed of Pathans
was also reinforced.
Even though there are a large number of Afghan
resistance groups operating in Peshawar (Pakistan),
intractable ideological and personality differences have
foiled all attempts to unify them. Therefore, in the summer
of 1981, there emerged two separate coalitions. The
Fundamentalists and Moderates.
The Fundamentalists (a coalition of seven parties) are
conservative in outlook and seek a radical restructuring of
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the Afghan society strictly on Islamic principles. This
group has vehemently opposed the Afghan regimes since the
ouster of King Zahir Shah in 1973. The principal parties
forming the coalition are: Jamiat-i-I s lami of Prof:
Burhanuddin Rabbani, Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
Hezb-i-Islami of Yunis Khalis, Itihad-i-Islami Baraye Azadi
Afghanistan of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayaf, Harakat-i-Enqilab
Islami of Rafiullah Al-Mansuri and the Islamic Front or
National Liberation Front of Muhammad Mir. The following is
a brief overview of these groups.
JAMIAT-I-I SLAM
I
: - (led by Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani). This
group enjoys the support of Tajiks and even though it is
interested in establishing a government based on Islamic law,
it would still "permit an openly competitive political system
in which modernists could participate."^ This group
exercises influence over the guerrilla bands operating in the
northern belt of Afghanistan which extends from Badakhashan
province in the northeast to Herat province in the
northwest. Most importantly, this group enjoys the support
of Pakistan's Jamiat-i-Islami. With General Zia-ul-Haq's
close links to the Jamiat-i-Islami of Pakistan, this group
has gained in influence. The leader of this group is
considered far more cooperative than Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
HEZB-I-ISLA MI: - (led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). This group
was founded in 1968 by traditionalist Muslim students in
Kabul to oppose modernist and leftist trends. It was the
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first important group to oppose Taraki's government. 8 This
party has ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia which in 1980,
sought to establish an orthodox Moslem government in
Q
Afghanistan. It persistently seeks to keep itself away from
the other Afghan emigre groups and is considered very well
organized with a large following. Its leader is the most
controversial figure; he is an awoved supporter of a radical
moslem revolution and an antagonist of the west.
HEZB-I-ISLA MI; - (led by Yunis Khalis). The leader of this
party belongs to the class of ulema (religious scholars) who
had during the constitutional period formed their own
fundamentalist group. The principal areas in which this
group is operating are Nangrahar and Kabul provinces. 10
THE ISLAM IC FRONT OR NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT ; - (led by
Mohammad Mir). The leader of this group defected from Jabha-
i-Milli Nijat of Sibghatullah Al-Majadeddi and had no
affiliated guerrilla bonds operating in Afghanistan.
ITIHAD-I-ISLAMI BARAYE AZADI AFGHANISTAN ; - (led by Abd-i-Rab
Rasoul Sayaf). Like Hezb-i-Islami's Gulbuddin the leader of
this party is anti west and strongly advocates the
establishment of an Iranian-type of revolutionary islamic
government in Afghanistan.
HARAKAT-I-ENQILAB ISLAMI ; - (led by Nasrullah Mansour) . This
party has two affiliated groups in northern Afghanistan. It
originally broke away from Nabi Muhammadi's Harakat
organization in 1981.
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HARAKAT-I-ENQILAB ISLA MI; - (led by Rafiullah Al-Mousin).
This is also a splinter group of Nabi Mohammadi's Harakat and
does not have a large following.
The Moderates (a coalition of three parties) concentrate
their energies on liberating Afghanistan from the domination
of Soviet invaders and communist atheism, are striving for
the establishment of the Islamic system and an elected
Islamic government. The three parties that form this
coalition are Mahaz-i-Milli Islami of Sayed Ahmad Gailani,
Harakat-i-Enqilab-i-Islami- of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and
Jablia-i-Milli Nijat of Sibghatullah Al-Ma jadeddi. The
support base of moderates can be found in the conservative
religious elite, Pirs, Sufis, tribal chiefs and belong to the
dominant classes of Afghanistan.
MAHAZ-I- M ILLI ISLAMI; - (led by Sayed Ahmad Gailani).
Gailani comes from a respected Pushtun family and enjoys the
support of Pushtun tribes of the Paktia region. He began to
inspire and guide his tribal followers after establishing
resistance headquarters in the tribal area of Pakistan
adjoining Paktia. 11 But due to poor organizational structure
his influence began to decline by 1983. This group has made
extensive tours of the Western countries with the objective
of promoting their cause.
HARAKAT-I_-ENQI_LAB-I_-I^SLAMI_: - (led by Mohammad Nabi
Mohammadi). Politically this is the most flexible party and
has the largest number of affiliated guerrilla bands in
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Afghanistan. This party is poorly organized and was severely
weakened by the defection of Nasrullah Mansour and Rafiullah
Mousin, who joined the fundamentalist coalition. It
comprises middle and lower middle class mullahs who exercise
a profound influence over the rural population. 12
JABHA-I- M ILLI NIJAT ; - (led by Sibghatullah Al-Mogadeddi)
.
This party was founded after the 1978 coup with the support
of intellectuals from Saudi Arabia and other states of the
Persian Gulf. This party is not very well organized; it has
the support of Pushtuns and very few guerrilla bands
associate with it. The leader of this party is a member of
the Hazrat Sahib Shor Bazaar family of the Naqshbandi order,
which is a traditionally influential religious family.
A DISUNITED RESISTANCE ; - Both the fundamentalists and
moderates differ from one another in terms of their divergent
ideologies, social backgrounds, leadership styles and
perceptions of the future. The fundamentalists come from the
educated middle and lower middle class. They hold King Zahir
Shah responsible for the plight of the Afghans and seek to
establish a theocratic state. The moderates on the other
hand belong to the elite strata of the Afghan society; they
'are less critical of King Zahir Shah and are striving to
maintain the status quo ante. These two factions also differ
in their perceptions of the role of Islam in Afghanistan.
The fundamentalists believe that Islam should play a pivotal
role in all spheres of governmental and social affairs.
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While the moderates assert that Islam should be the private
business of an individual. As a result of these disparate
perceptions, all attempts aimed at unification of these two
factions have either failed or have yielded little results.
As in some other societies, linguistic, religious and
ethnic ties have created cleavages in Afghan society as well.
These divisions are very pronounced, which makes unification
attempts infeasible. Linguistic differences have surfaced
between those who speak dari and those who speak pushto
(Hazaris, Tajiks speak Dari and Pushtuns and Nuristanis speak
Pushto). In the religious sphere the resistance group like
Shura-i-Enqelab-i-Ettefaq-i-Islami Afghanistan follow the
Shiite Muslim faith; whereas the other groups are
predominately sunni muslims. The different ethnic groups are
highly suspicious of Pushtuns whom they charge with the
oppression of non-Pushtuns by depriving them of their
legitimate rights. The animosity of the different ethnic
groups towards Pushtuns is most aptly summed up in a Tajik
proverb, "trust a snake before a harlot and a harlot before a
Pathan." 13
Another factor which impedes all attempts towards an
effective unification is the lack of a strategy and an
organizational plan among the Afghan emigre groups to counter
Soviet aggression. The resistance groups have little
knowledge about enemy positions and therefore they cannot
effectively put a stop to the Soviet encroachments. Their
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efforts to compete with each other for foreign support
complicates the resistance even further.
Thus, ideological, religious, ethnic and strategic
disparities hamper any concerted drive of the Afghan groups
against the Soviet control. Here a parallel can be drawn
with the Basmachi revolt of 1920s which failed primarily
because of the same differences which are found among Afghan
resistance groups.
The principal weakness of the basmachi movement was
its lack of unity. The various detachments
operated independently of each other under the
leadership of ambitious and jealous chieftains, who
refused to coordinate their activities ... It
represented essentially a number of unconnected
tribal revolts and exhibited all the shortcomings
of such forms of resistance. It never attained its
ultimate purpose—the overthrow of Russian rule in
Turkestan—because the Russians were infinitely
better organized, controlled the cities and the
lines of communications, and had at their disposal
a more
1
/unierous and more experienced armed
forces. 4
The Soviets have learnt some obvious lessons from the
Basmachi incident but the resistance groups, although well
aware of this rebellion have not been able to apply its
lessons to their own conduct.
THE GOALS OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE GROUPS ; -
Although the Afghan emigre groups differ in perceptions,
yet there is a general consensus among them as far as the
achievement of their goals is concerned. First of all they
are interested in a total and an unconditional withdrawal of
the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Second, they are
interested in eliminating the leftist influence from the
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country and wish to establish an Islamic state (they are
however, divided on the nature of this theocratic state).
Third, they seek to end the age old Pushtun domination by
granting greater autonomy to the various ethnic groups. The
leaders of the Hazara, Tajik and Nuristani freedom fighters
are particularly interested in bringing an end to their
subjugation at the hands of the Pushtuns. Fourth, the
various Afghan emigre organizations are interested in seeing
Afghanistan pursue a nonaligned policy and total independence
in the conduct of its relations. Finally, they would like to
see the restoration of the tribal system which is an
important institution of the Afghan society. With the
exception of Tajiks, all other ethnic groups are traditional
tribal societies. These tribes are led by the tribal chiefs
known as Khans, some of whom enjoy complete control of tribal
wealth and treat ordinary tribesmen as serfs or tenant
farmers. They also have complete power in determining the
social and judicial policies of their tribes. This is an
important institution which the Afghan expatriates would like
to restore, because this gives them the power not only to
retain group identity but also to perpetuate tribal
prerogatives.
Thus, as a result of the fragmentation among the
Mujahideen it has become difficult for them to speak with a
common voice and therefore they are weakened in terms of
their negotiating process. So far the Afghan Mujahideen have
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played a peripheral role in the whole negotiating process.
Since the two factions the fundamentalists and the modernists
are heavily radicalized they cannot contribute much to the
negotiated peace. They can certainly contribute to
prolonging the turmoil.
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The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979
changed the geopolitical picture for Pakistan. Afghanistan,
which had served as an age old buffer between the Russian
Empire and The British Indian Empire was now under the
occupation of the Soviet Union and had ceased to exist as a
buffer state for Pakistan. The elimination of this buffer
state posed a threat to Pakistan which began to be referred
to as the front-line state.
Under the present situation, Pakistan is endeavoring to
achieve some tangible results by seeking a political solution
to the Afghanistan crisis. The goals being pursued by
Pakistan are the following. First, perpetuation of a buffer
state between themselves and the Soviets. Second, is to
bring about the return of over 3.2 million refugees. Third,
to see Afghanistan emerge as an Islamic state, after the
ouster of Soviet forces. Fourth, find an appealing solution
to Afghanistan quagmire for the expatriate population.
Finally, the crisis provides the military accessibility to
advanced weapons being proferred by the U.S. These are some
of the objectives which Pakistan is most zealously trying to
achieve. These objectives constitute this chapter in turn.
Before we proceed further with an in depth analysis of
the four objectives listed above, it is important to provide
a brief overview of Pak-Afghan relations since 1947. Pak-
Afghan relations have been inherently unstable from the very
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outset. The main cause of estranged relations between the
two countries was the Pushtunistan issue. It was the demand
on behalf of the Afghan government for the incorporation of
Pushto speaking areas into Afghanistan or their incorporation
as an independent state to be called Pushtunistan. This
state of Pushtunistan was to include Pakistani territories of
Chitral, Hazara, Kohistan, Swat, Dir, Buner, Peshawar, Tirah,
Bajaur, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan,
Waziristan, Khyber, Pezu, Gomal, Bolan, and Malakand. 1 The
Pakistani government rejected this demand and felt that the
issue had been settled long ago in 1893 by the British India.
The British drew the Durand Line, which the Afghan government
accepted under duress but reserved an irredentist claim to
the Pushto speaking regions lying in Pakistan. Thus, this
remained as a constant irritant between the two countries and
was also the cause of major border clashes between the two
countries in 1950, 1955 and 1961. Later, during late Premier
Z.A. Bhutto's tenure an attempt was made to bring about a
rapproachment in Pak-Afghan relations. Later, both President
Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan and Nur Mohammad Taraki of Afghanistan
met in Kabul and agreed to develop friendly relations and
resolve their differences through friendship. This was the
nature of relationship between the two countries when the
Soviets stepped into Afghanistan. Since then Pakistan is
striving to play a major role in seeking a political solution
to the Afghan dilemma.
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The first objective that the Pakistani government wants
to achieve is to create a buffer zone between themselves and
the Soviets. It is always difficult for a country to be
sitting next to a super power. There are always problems
associated if a weak country is located close to a super
power because it becomes difficult for a weaker state to live
under the shadow of a super power. Pakistanis have therefore
inherited the Great Game, that is perpetuation of a buffer
state between themselves and the Soviets. It is the threat
emanating from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan that
induces Pakistan to seek a buffer state in the form of
Afghanistan.
Pakistan has vehemently opposed the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and has led several international condemnations
of the Soviet act. Pakistan managed to rally the support of
several non-aligned and OECD members of the UN in condemning
the Soviet policy towards Afghanistan. 2
The Soviets assert that one sixth of the Afghan refugees
who have fled to Pakistan for safe haven are involved in
insurgency tactics against the Soviets in Afghanistan. 3
Soviets accuse Pakistan for aiding the insurgents and have
admonished Pakistan time and again of dire consequences if it
continued to toe the U.S. line and served as a conduit of
arms to the Mujahideen (freedom fighters). For example, the
former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko once remarked
that if Pakistan continues to serve as a puppet of
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imperialism in the future, it will jeopardize its existence
and integrity as an independent state. 4 President Zia-ul-Haq
of Pakistan was also warned by Gorbachev at Konstantin
Chernenko's funeral, who remarked that unless Pakistan stops
its aggressive actions against Afghanistan the Soviet Union
would treat the Zia government in the same manner as the
Sandinistas are treated by the Reagan administration. 5
As a result of the geographical proximity with
Afghanistan now under the Soviet forces, Pakistan is
interested to see Afghanistan emerge as a buffer between the
Soviet Union and itself. The immediate threat facing
Pakistan is that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and their
Afghan surrogates might seek to foment trouble in Baluchistan
and the North West Frontier province of Pakistan. These two
politically volatile provinces are of great importance to the
Soviets, particularly Baluchistan which has a natural deep
warm-water harbor, called Gwadar. With the invasion of
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is closer than ever to see the
implementation of its long awaited goal of reaching the warm
water ports, a goal that has thus far eluded the Soviets and
their predecessors. The Soviets access to Gwadar would
enable them to control the Persian Gulf and the strategic
Strait of Hormuz which is about 400 miles to the west of
Gwadar. The anxiety over Gwadar is rekindled by Soviet
threats to teach Pakistan a lesson for its pro Washington
stance by arming Baluch insurgents, 6 because Baluchistan in
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the past has been a hot bed of separatist tendencies. Such a
situation would not only deflect attention from Afghanistan
but would also escalate disaffection in Baluchistan
culminating in civil strife and political instability of
Pakistan.
With the annexation of Wakhan Valley a 150-mile strip of
land (which was given to Kabul in the nineteenth century to
keep the Russian Empire from expanding in the direction of
the British Empire) Pakistan's northern borders stand
vulnerable to the Soviet attack. Such a situation provides
the Soviet Union with an opportunity to break Pakistan's link
with its ally in the north, namely, China which has been an
arch rival of the Soviets. It also gives India an incentive
to wrest Kashmir from Pakistan with the acquiesence of the
Soviets.
The second major objective of Pakistan is to bring about
the return of over 3,000,000 refugees. The growing influx of
the Afghan refugees has placed a staggering strain on
Pakistan's limited resources and has also precipitated
tension between the refugees and the local residents of the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) . The reason for the anti
refugee sentiments is that disputes pertaining to land, water
rights and deforestation have surfaced in some 282 refugee
villages. These disputes have quite often led to violent
clashes between the Afghan refugees and local residents. 7 In
order to avoid destabilization of the two provinces it is
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important that Afghanistan's old status of a buffer state be
restored and refugees return to their homeland.
Third, Pakistan is also interested to see Afghanistan
emerge as an Islamic state followed after the withdrawal of
the Soviet forces. In this age of Muslim revivalism, an
Islamic Afghanistan would not only reinforce Pakistan Islamic
stance but would also give impetus to other Muslim countries
to seek unity of the Muslim Ummah (community).
Fourth, objective of Pakistan is to find a solution to
the Afghan crisis which would be readily acceptable to the
expatriate population thus facilitating their safe return to
Afghanistan. The longer the Afghan refugees reside in
Pakistan more precarious would be the internal situation in
Pakistan. A majority of the refugees are Pakhtuns who belong
to the same ethnic stock as the Pakistani Pakhtuns. For
decades the National Democratic Party of Abdul Wali Khan had
been clamoring for secession or creation of an independent
state; but now because of the clashes with the local
residents their demand for Pushtunistan has been put on a
backburner. This situation could however change once the
Soviets have pulled out from Afghanistan and the refugees
refuse to go back to their homeland. Such a situation might
create renewed agitation within Pakistan itself and lead to
the destabilization of the country.
Finally, the ongoing Afghan crisis has provided the
Pakistani military an easy access to weapons for bolstering
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its defense vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India. United States
is the principal donor of arms to Pakistan. The invasion of
Afghanistan compelled United States to change its erstwhile
policy of arms embargo on Pakistan. The $3.2 billion aid
package from United States to Pakistan greatly strengthened
the military government's position in Pakistan. It also
provided the Zia government an opportunity to deflect
domestic political pressures steming from within Pakistan, on
the pretext that any domestic political agitation would
severely hamper the government's efforts to deal with any
counter insurgency efforts on part of the Kabul-Moscow
government.
To conclude, from the preceding Pakistani imperatives it
can be inferred that Pakistan as one of the four parties
involved in the negotiating process would like to arrive at a
viable solution to the Afghan crisis which would not overlook
the following Pakistani objectives: First to see Afghanistan
emerge as a buffer state between Pakistan and the Soviet
Union. Second, to facilitate a safe return of the Afghan
refugees back to their homeland. Third, to see Afghanistan
emerge as an Islamic state. Fourth, find a solution to the
Afghan crisis which would be readily acceptable to the Afghan
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In the introduction a model was laid out which specified
the areas of negotiations so that the interested parties
could resolve the dispute and arrive at a mutually acceptable
settlement. Then in each of the subsequent chapters the
negotiable areas were discussed at length, agreement on which
would facilitate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan. The trick for the various parties is to create
an equilibrium so that the boundaries in the system can be
established. The question arises what should the four
parties do to arrive at a viable political equilibrium.
THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS : -
The Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
meeting under the auspices of the United Nations have so far
had had eight rounds of indirect talks which began in April
1982. These talks have been made possible with the
assistance of the UN Under-Secretary General for Political
Affairs, Diego Cordovez. Pakistan has so far refused to hold
direct talks with the Soviet installed government in Kabul
because holding direct talks would tantamount to legitimizing
the Kabul puppet government. Cordovez has been engaged in
shuttle diplomacy between Islamabad and Kabul trying to
negotiate the position of each while keeping Iranians
officially abreast of the discussions and unofficially
informing the Soviets of the developments at the proximity
talks. In June 1985, the UN announced that the four involved
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parties had agreed on three out of the four proposed
principles. The principles agreed by the concerned parties
were: (1) Non-interference in Afghanistan's domestic
affairs, (2) International guarantees of a settlement (3)
Voluntary return of Afghan refugees.
Agreement on the fourth principle regarding troop
withdrawal was the major stumbling block. The Soviet Union
contended that it would withdraw the troops when U.S.
sponsored aid to the Mujahideen through Pakistan is halted.
By 1983, the Soviets had decided to establish a time table
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, something which had
evaded the earlier two sessions at Geneva.
In December 1985, the Soviet Union and the U.S. were
working behind-the-scenes deal that would facilitate Soviet
withdrawal. Under the Soviet plan the U.S. and its allies,
particularly Pakistan, were to abstain from providing arms to
the Mujahideen before time table for the troop withdrawal
could be decided upon. Under this joint U.S.-Soviet deal
Afghanistan and Pakistan were to remain independent and
sovereign. In effect, "Afghanistan will become an Islamic
Finland and Pakistan an Islamic Austria. . . . Both
countries would become politically neutral but Afghanistan
would stay in the Soviet sphere of influence while Pakistan a
western ally." 2 In July 1986, the Soviet Union had formally
offered to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan over a four-
year period which was not acceptable to Pakistan, because it
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believed that a withdrawal could take place in four months or
less. However, the seventh round of the Geneva parlays
between Pakistan and Kabul ended in a deadlock in August over
a mutually acceptable time table for the Soviet pull out from
Afghanistan. Finally the eighth round of proximity talks
resumed in February-March, 1987. This round of talks halted
when differences over a time-table for withdrawal could not
be resolved. While Moscow had considerably shortened the
time span of a possible troop withdrawal, its position, as
presented by Afghan negotiators in Geneva, still falls short
of anything that would be acceptable to Pakistan or the U.S.
Pakistani negotiators have been reluctant to accept a long
withdrawal time frame, since this would give Soviets a free
hand to move against the Mujahideen, who would be stripped of
their safe bases and logistical support. Another issue that
was discussed at this meeting was the type of government that
would be left in Afghanistan once the Soviets withdrew.
According to one western diplomat familiar with the issue
remarked that a broad-based government with some Mujahideen
participation would be most suitable, he added that the
problem was that the Soviets and the Mujahideen were bitterly
opposed to each other for any viable solution to be arrived
at. It was suggested at the conference that the former
Afghan King Mohammad Zahir Shah could be a unifying force in
Afghanistan. Quite recently Mikhail S. Gorbachev hinted in
an interview that the Soviet Union would accept the former
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King Mohammad Zahir Shah, as part of a coalition government
to hold power after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
c
Afghanistan.
To sum up, even though the name of the king has been
suggested as a figurehead in the coalition government it is
not quite clear if he would be acceptable to the Mujahideen.
Since they are split on the acceptability of the king even as
an interim leader, they might not accept him. The success of
the UN shuttle diplomacy depends on securing two goals—first
a short and an acceptable time-table for the withdrawal of
the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Second, a mutual
consensus of the four interlocuters on the type of government
there should be in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.
The areas of non-negotiability of each of the parties
involved are as follows: The Soviet Union would never like
Afghanistan to leave its sphere of influence. The
continuation of a 1978 treaty establishing a Finland-style
security relationship between Moscow and Kabul remains a non-
negotiable Soviet demand. The Soviet Union would like to
withdraw its forces but because of its heavy military
investment in Afghanistan, it would like to have a compliant
Afghan regime. The Soviet Union would also like to secure
their hold over the Central Asian Republics, so that these
republics are not affected by Afghanistan. The United States
is interested to see the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan, so that the United States preeminence in the
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Persian Gulf and the warm water port (areas of 'vital
interests') is not threatened by the Soviet advance
southwards.
Any agreement which ignores a safe return of the Afghan
refugees to their homeland and creation of Afghanistan as a
buffer state between Pakistan and the Soviet Union is not
acceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan would also like to see an
Islamic system evolve in Afghanistan so that it bolsters
Pakistan's own Islamic stance.
To arrive at a viable solution to the Afghan dilemma, it
is important that the Mujahideen be invited to participate in
the negotiation process. Any settlement which does not
include their participation would preclude the chances of
resolving the dispute. The expatriate population would like
to have a significant presence in the government, they would
neither like to have a Marxist nor a secular state to be
established in Afghanistan. These then are the non-
negotiable areas within the restraints of these it is
possible to find a viable solution.
In the negotiating process there are four central issues
which are: outside interference, return of the refugees,
non-aligned status and the Soviet withdrawal. For a
settlement to be arrived at, all outside interference (U.S.
and Pakistan) in Afghanistan needs to be stopped provided the
Soviets agree on a short time frame for a withdrawal. A safe
return of the refugees is another important issue which has
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been discussed at several Geneva proximity talks by Pakistan
the host to over 3.2 million refugees. Another central issue
to the negotiating process is the restoration of
Afghanistan's non-aligned status. But for the Soviet Union
interpretation of the non-aligned status is the Soviet
Union's continued influence over Afghanistan.
Finally, the issue of the Soviet withdrawal is dependent
upon the issue which was not originally in the four issues,
that is the form of government. The Soviets and Mujahideen
have to arrive at some sort of a compromise as far as the
formation of government is concerned. The Soviets have shown
a seeming flexibility on the form of government. But is it
possible to establish a system that is sufficiently Islamic
to satisfy the Mujahideen but sufficiently non-threatening to
satisfy the Soviets. Thus, to conclude outside interference,
return of the refugees, non-aligned status, Soviet withdrawal
and form of government are the remaining problems which
remain the major puzzles of the Afghan conflict.
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On the eve of Christmas in 1979, the Soviet Union began
the invasion of Afghanistan and precipitated a crisis that
has continued now for eight years. The Afghanistan crisis
affected the entire geopolitical situation in the Southwest
Asian region and also hampered the process of detente between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It rendered close to four million
Afghan refugees homeless who ended up seeking political
asylum in the neighboring country of Pakistan in order to
avoid persecution in their own homeland.
So far the solution to the Afghanistan crisis has
remained elusive. The four parties involved the Soviet
Union, Afghanistan, the United States, Pakistan and the
Afghan expatriate population have tried to find a viable
solution which would be readily acceptable to all, but
efforts in this direction have been less than successful.
Each party seeks to safeguard its own interest thus leaving
very little to be negotiated in order to find a viable
solution to the problem. The Soviet Union wants to keep
Afghanistan under its sphere of influence and on this
condition they are ready to withdraw provided there is no
outside interference from the U.S. and Pakistan. The United
States wants the Soviet Union to pull out from Afghanistan so
that the U.S.S.R's expansion southward to the Persian Gulf
region can be contained. Pakistan is hoping that the Soviets
would withdraw and facilitate a safe return of the refugees
I
to Afghanistan. The Afghan expatriate population would like
to see Afghanistan free of the Soviets and surface once again
as an Islamic country. Several factions of the Afghan
expatriate population are divided on the system of government
that would evolve in Afghanistan. Thus, these remain the
non-negotiable areas of each of the party involved in this
dispute.
Thus far, the eight rounds of proximity talks at Geneva
have yielded fewer results. The major stumbling block to the
solution of the crisis remains the time frame for the
withdrawal of the Soviet forces and the form of government
that would be instituted in Afghanistan.
